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LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RELATIONS: REVISITING TWENTY-ONE YEARS
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
RUTH L. OKEDIJI*

INTRODUCTION
In 1994, over 150 nations converged in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, and completed what was, at that time, the most
ambitious multilateral intellectual property (IP) agreement ever
negotiated. Built on the cornerstone of the “Great Conventions,”1
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement)2 profoundly altered the nature, scope, and economic
consequences of international intellectual property regulation. 3
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Workshop (March 2014), NYU Law School Colloquium on Globalization and
Developing Countries (March 2014), the 2014 International Intellectual Property
Scholars Roundtable (May 2014), and the University of Toronto Law School
Innovation Law Workshop (September 2014).
1 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3 See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L L. 345 (1995)
[hereinafter Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards] (discussing global economic
consequences of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Keith E. Maskus, Lessons from
Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV.
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The presumptive goal of the Uruguay Round negotiations, and its
specific manifestation in the TRIPS Agreement, was to secure
export markets for a wide variety of knowledge goods in which
industrialized countries had long held a competitive advantage. In
more fundamental terms, the TRIPS Agreement sought to reshape
the conditions of future global competition, particularly the extent
to which developing countries could use intellectual property as a
form of industrial policy in pursuit of strategic development
objectives.
With strong upgrades in patent and copyright
protection, seminal international coverage of new subject matter,
and a celebrated enforcement mechanism,4 the TRIPS Agreement
targeted the soft underbelly of the development process.5 In so
doing, however, it made access to knowledge and technology
acquisition by firms in developing countries more costly,6 thereby
undermining their ability to compete in a global knowledge
economy, at least in the short run. More insidiously, the TRIPS
Agreement heralded a potent blend of global and local politics,7
thus defining a new era of private sector influence in the political
economy of globalized intellectual property norms. 8 The policy
2219, 2228-30 (2000) (predicting global impact of rent transfers as a result of
international patent regulation under the TRIPS Agreement).
4 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 1(2), 64.
5 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92
AM. ECON. REV., 460, 483 (2002) (“One of the most important determinants of the
pace of growth is the acquisition of knowledge”); INT’L BANK OF RECONSTR. & DEV.,
WORLD BANK GROUP, LIFELONG LEARNING IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY:
CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (2003) (“A knowledge-based economy
relies primarily on the use of ideas rather than physical abilities and on the
application of technology rather than the transformation of raw materials or the
exploitation of cheap labor.”). See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges
for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 473 (2001)
(providing a table of estimated economic impact of TRIPS patent changes for
selected countries).
6 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., The TRIPS
Agreement and Developing Countries 36, UNCTAD/ITE/1 (1996) (providing
estimates of costs of TRIPS implementation in some developing countries); INT’L
BANK FOR RECONSTR. & DEV., WORLD BANK, Global Economic Prospects and the
Developing
Countries
136
(2002),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2002/Resources/gep2002complete.
pdf (citing J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, World Bank, Implementation of
Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge (1999) (manuscript)).
7 See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 845–48 (2003) (discussing
cooperation of US, Japan and EU firms in getting their governments to pursue the
TRIPS Agreement).
8
See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
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implications of the new rules established by the TRIPS Agreement
arose first in the context of its patent provisions. In particular,
South Africa played the lead role in a public health crisis that
unfolded dramatically on the global stage.9 The moral, ethical and
legally controversial arguments about the extent to which TRIPS
obligations require an unraveling of the domestic social welfare
calculus of a WTO member state galvanized an entire “access-tomedicines” movement that ricocheted around the world. 10 The
controversy produced a formal amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement, known colloquially as the “Doha Declaration,”11 that
clarified the right of WTO member states to interpret the
Agreement “in light of [its] object and purpose . . . .”12 It also
specifically reaffirmed the right of member states to protect public

GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). In addition to the
traditional state actors, several other powerful forces are at play, including large
multinational corporations, industry lobbyists, internet intermediaries,
international organizations, and NGOs. The biggest direct stake in TRIPS
outcomes was held by a handful of industry actors, whose global monopolies
depended on securing strong worldwide IP protection: the pharmaceutical
industry ($650 billion annual revenue, estimated to increase to $1.5 trillion), the
entertainment and software industries ($800 billion), and the commercial seed
industry ($21 billion). See generally CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME:
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (2009). With so much at stake, these industry
players continue to exert significant pressure and influence domestically,
producing new webs of multilateral IP agreements.
9 See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Industry to Drop AIDS Drug Lawsuit Against South
Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1999, at A3 (reporting on patent infringement
controversy between U.S. pharmaceutical companies and South African
government over the country’s loosening of patent laws to reduce medical costs
for AIDS patients). In 1997, South Africa passed a law that permitted exceptions
to national patent laws (primarily compulsory licensing and parallel importing) to
reduce the price of AIDS pharmaceuticals. This resulted in an international
controversy, with the United States threatening to impose unilateral trade
sanctions.
However, strong adverse public reaction forced the Clinton
administration to back down, and the dispute was quietly settled without the
involvement of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.
10 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New
Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 821–39 (2008) (describing the
origins and development of the “Access to Knowledge” movement).
11 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.ht
m.
12
Id. ¶ 5(a).
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health.13
Today, the access to medicines movement and its corollary, the
access to knowledge movement,14 are key players in the politics of
international intellectual property relations. The movements
represent a globally linked and loosely organized opposition to the
untested assumptions and overarching philosophy of the TRIPS
Agreement.
Working within a framework animated by
considerations of social justice, liberty ideals and good governance,
this ad-hoc alliance of activists, scholars and organizations
maintains close watch over the normative contours of the
multilateral IP system and promotes strategies to resist
deterministic outcomes of global IP norms. In so doing, many of
the alliance’s chief protagonists also challenge and seek to
influence domestic political processes that are inordinately
influenced by the economic claims of industries whose business
income flow principally from an expansive trough of IP rights.
Twenty-one years later, the IP world for which the Uruguay
Round laid its foundation is very different from what many
imagined at the end of the negotiations in 1994. The TRIPS
Agreement has neither confirmed the worst fears of developing
countries nor accomplished the greatest hopes of the developed
ones. Instead, both sides have inserted important points of
adherence and resistance to the negotiated global IP norms, thus
destabilizing many of the Agreement’s implicit political and
economic bargains. On the one hand, developed countries have
moved aggressively to adopt ever more pervasive strategies to
curtail unilateral exercises of IP policy in developing countries. At
the same time, new sites of resistance to the built-in normative
flexibility recognized by the TRIPS Agreement have become
entrenched in a viral web of bilateral, regional and plurilateral
agreements. 15 For their part, some developing countries are
demonstrating nascent institutional capabilities that have
facilitated creative approaches to implementing TRIPS obligations,
while advancing ideals of welfare unique to national
circumstances. To be clear, some of these developments are not
specifically directed at TRIPS obligations.
Rather, as these
countries institutionalize international obligations in areas such as
human rights, the environment or public health, IP norms have
Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 5(c).
Kapczynski, supra note 10.
15 Maira Sutton, TPP: Internet Freedom Activists Protest Secret Trade Agreement
Being Negotiated this Week, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 14, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/tpp-another-backroom-deal.
13
14
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become the implicit, and in some cases explicit, subject of legal
innovation in a broader scheme of national welfare planning.
For my purposes in this Article, legal innovation does not
consist simply of episodic responses to particular international
pressures. Rather, legal innovation is (i) characterized by the
potential that the selected tools for innovation are sustainable
within the local legal culture; (ii) fueled by a clearly identified
national development purpose or strategy; and (iii) effectuated
principally by local actors. I define legal innovation as the
development of new techniques, institutions and/or methods that
respond to TRIPS obligations and facilitate their implementation in
a manner consistent with national welfare goals. This approach
turns the TRIPS Agreement inwards by encompassing local needs,
priorities, and politics in a deliberate reconciliation of multilateral
obligations and domestic economic, cultural and political interests.
As a result, legal innovation has forged new approaches to the role
of IP in national economic policy, evidenced by unfolding
developments in India, South Africa and Brazil.16 Legal innovation
has also engendered new domestic regimes to attract foreign
investment in Malta,17 has offered opportunities for constitutional
considerations to re-direct the dominance of the classical economic
narrative of IP in Kenya, 18 and, paradoxically, has added to
existing IP standards, particularly in the realm of patentable
subject matter, in ways that rebalance power equities between
informal knowledge holders and patent applicants in China and
India. 19 Within the international IP policy space, these various
forms of legal innovation may suggest that the minimum
standards of the TRIPS Agreement that evoked such significant
global consternation may yet offer a basis for countries to construct
policy spaces in alignment with development goals. These spaces
may, in turn, allow domestic institutions to interrogate the values
of the Agreement in light of broader considerations of domestic
human welfare.
Framed in this manner, legal innovation
constitutes a method for more finely honed approaches to defining
sovereign responsibility for the effects of IP rights in society and for
indirectly circumscribing the scope of Executive power in bilateral
See infra Part 3.1.2.
See infra Part 3.1.3.
18 See infra Part 2.1.3. (discussing the Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-General case,
in which the Kenyan High Court overturned a TRIPS-driven anti-counterfeiting
statute to preserve access to affordable, life-saving generic drugs).
19 See infra Part 2.1.3.
16
17
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or multilateral norm-setting exercises.20 In Part 1, I describe how
the TRIPS Agreement ultimately opened the policy spaces
conducive to legal innovation. I highlight the unfulfilled promise
of the Agreement, offering a critique of the model of “hard”
harmonization that it incorporates. In Part 2, I briefly review the
structure and main provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, focusing
on the patent provisions that were the most challenging during the
negotiations. I include a short analysis of how those provisions
and key aspects of the architecture of the Agreement have defined
the outer limits of the scope for legal innovation efforts in
developing countries. In Part 3, I consider examples of legal and
institutional innovation in emerging economies and link them to
the resilience of development aspirations, which are key
motivators for domestic actors’ creative responses to TRIPS
obligations. Finally, in Part 4, I discuss the implications of new
multilateral initiatives that seek to build on the TRIPS baseline. I
explore modes of legal innovation in the ongoing IP reform efforts
in Brazil and South Africa. In addition, Part 4 reflects on the
institutional capacity and processes of IP reform, which enable
legal innovation to thrive. Specifically, IP reform initiatives
facilitate legal innovation first by making national IP policy a
subject of public discourse and then by creating a process in which
multiple stakeholders engage in dialogue with relevant IP agencies
as well as each other. Ultimately, I suggest that the instability
generated by a new breed of plurilateral agreements has ushered
multilateral IP norm-setting, and the TRIPS Agreement
specifically, into an age of uncertainty. This age, I propose, is a
harbinger for leveraging legal innovation to re-institute more
defensible norms in the fabric of multilateral IP treaties. It is
unclear how long the specific types of innovative oeuvres I discuss
in this Article will last or to what extent developing countries can
resist the inevitable backlash that will certainly continue to come
from developed countries. A sustained capacity to engage in forms
of legal innovation that advance a distinctive domestic welfare
20
Courts in the U.S., for example, have issued a series of opinions that
clearly are in tension with the maximalist narrative of the TRIPS Agreement. See,
e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(holding that a composition involving isolated DNA was not patent eligible);
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (holding that a business method of
hedging financial losses in energy industry not patent eligible); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (holding that
a medical diagnostic method that added administering steps to a natural
correlation was not patent eligible); see also infra note 106 and accompanying text
(discussing the same cases).
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vision, while credibly complying with the TRIPS Agreement, will
define the extent to which developing countries can meaningfully
limit the potential for adverse welfare consequences from
heightened costs of access to knowledge and technological inputs.
But, it is the comparative national institutional capacity and agility
of the developed and developing countries alike that will
ultimately define the efficacy of the TRIPS Agreement and its
progeny in the years to come.
1. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
BARGAINING TO THE BASELINE
Few participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations
anticipated the complex political and legal aftershocks that
resonated after the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement. Part 1 will
present how legal innovation in response to the TRIPS Agreement
was largely facilitated by the structure of the Agreement. Next,
Part 1 explains how the underlying goals of the Agreement harmonization and enforcement - opened policy spaces in which
countries could conceive of the legal measures I later describe as
legal innovation. Lastly, I explain how the TRIPS Agreement’s
minimum standards in the patent context recalibrated the global
policy landscape in favor of industry and private actors, thereby
placing developing countries in the strategic position of weighing
compliance measures against their own domestic welfare calculus.
1.1.

TRIPS as the Source of Legal Innovation

Two important developments suggest the TRIPS Agreement
may have accomplished a goal far more significant for
development, and more telling for the future of IP harmonization,
than any of the normative concerns occupying the scholarly debate
for the past two decades.
First, the TRIPS Agreement greatly expanded the power of
domestic IP agencies in all countries regardless of development or
income levels. 21 A new professional class of IP technocrats
21
See, e.g., National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrate
gy.pdf (“By 2020, China will become a country with a comparatively high level in
terms of the creation, utilization, protection and administration of patents . . . . ”).
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emerged in both the private and public spheres, advising,
strategizing, advocating or defending particular positions in
domestic and international fora.22 In developing countries, the rise
of a veritable cottage industry of TRIPS professionals endeavoring
to shape national legal regimes to ensure TRIPS compliance also
succeeded, in a few cases, in inducing the creation of new IP
bureaucracies where none previously existed, 23 or in greatly
expanding those that did.24 Private industry consultants, technical
assistance programs funded from the public purses of the U.S. and
European Union, and training programs by the WTO and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) established a
cultural and legal orientation about IP that emphasized particular
interpretations of TRIPS and sought to strengthen national
enforcement prospects of the Agreement.25
The relative success of this socio-legal ordering 26 ultimately
heightened the political costs associated with TRIPS for aidsending and aid-receiving countries alike. In the developing
countries receiving TRIPS/IP training and advice, those costs
involved threat of trade sanctions or the potential loss of foreign
aid should recommendations from consultants not be followed. In
the developed countries, the political costs were reflected in
contests between various agencies vying for control over national
policy directions,27 in the intensification of lobbyists’ efforts to steer
the direction of national strategies in the global IP arena, and in the
See generally DEERE, supra note 8.
22 Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance (U.C. Irvine
Sch.
of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
2014-53)
(2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2507576.
23
See, e.g., Business and Intellectual Property Authority, BIPA,
http://www.bipa.gov.na (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (stating that BIPA was
established to facilitate “effective administration of business and intellectual
property rights (IPRs) registration . . . .” ).
24 See also Bruce Reynolds & Susan K. Sell, China’s Role in Global Governance—
Foreign Exchange and Intellectual Property: A Comparison, (Research Ctr. for Chinese
Politics & Business, RCCPB Working Paper No. 31, Nov. 2012) (noting China’s
increasingly assertive behavior in IP global governance and exchange rate policy).
25 See generally DEERE, supra note 8, at 13.
26 See Gregory Shaffer & Susan K. Sell, Transnational Legal Ordering and Access
to Medicines, in RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MARGO A. BAGLEY, PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 97, 101-05 (2014) (emphasizing the importance of considering
transnational legal norms alongside international law and IP law).
27 Arti K. Rai, US Executive Branch Patent Policy, Global and Domestic, in RUTH
L. OKEDIJI & MARGO A. BAGLEY, PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 85, 89-91
(2014) (discussing differences in approaches to pharmaceutical patent policy
among US agencies).
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unavoidable domestic tradeoffs (or pay-offs) incurred,28 including
enlarged programs for IP agencies with seemingly unfettered
discretion to deal with multilateral IP policy issues.29
The second development has been the resilience of local
interests, sometimes working in concert with transnational actors,
in identifying those domestic considerations that could
successfully blunt the toughest edges of multilateral IP obligations.
Unlike U.S. courts or agencies that rarely engage in meaningful
analyses of international obligations in interpreting domestic IP
doctrines,30 there is growing evidence that a range of countries are
responding to TRIPS-related pressures by explicitly embracing,
and then creatively limiting, the price that a maximalist global IP
regime can exact from citizens and the policy costs it imposes on
governments.31 As discussed in Part 3, these initiatives potentiate
human development returns that extend beyond the creative
incentives of IP rights to include recognition of new social
freedoms, the hardening of equality principles in local laws,
judicial independence, and a general democratic largesse. These
returns are critical components of an environment in which legal
innovation can flourish. What is more, they are flourishing in the
precise institutional frameworks occasioned by, or deployed
28 J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the
Uruguay Round 14-15 (Asian Dev. Bank Econ. & Research Dep’t, Working Paper
No.
21,
2002),
available
at
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2002/wp021.pdf
(discussing
domestic tradeoffs involved in trade negotiations and contrasting this with
concessions related to TRIPS). As Professor Finger notes,

[E]xchanging market access for intellectual property rights brings with it
a more challenging domestic politics than do more traditional trade
agreements. It demands a broader domestic pay-off from winners to
losers than trade negotiations have supported in the past. It also requires
that the benefiting domestic constituency be created by the exchange,
something trade negotiations have never done. Id.
29 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO 2014-2018 Strategic
Plan (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_ 20142018_Strategic_Plan.pdf (delineating the USPTO’s plan to serve as a model for the
world and to collaborate with global IP partners).
30
Geri L. Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of
Trademark Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18, 26 (2007) (“[T]here is scant case law in which
a U.S. court discussed or applied the provisions of any treaty to a trademark
dispute, and it is unclear how much weight U.S. judges will accord to foreign
treaties and protocols unless the Supreme Court provides guidance. Several
courts that addressed the issue have expressly declined to apply the treaty
provisions.”). See generally Ruth L. Okediji, The Berne Convention in U.S. Courts (on
file with author) (analyzing the limited impact of Berne accession in US courts).
31 See infra Parts 3-4.
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within, the transnational efforts created principally to enforce the
TRIPS Agreement.
To be clear, legal innovation is also occurring in the developed
countries and, as in the developing countries, these are not usually
framed as a direct response to TRIPS. Nonetheless, legislative,
policy and judicial decisions, together with numerous agency
initiatives, arguably represent national adaptation to a penumbra
of pressures related to IP harmonization efforts since the
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement. Legislation such as the
America Invents Act (AIA) 32 and institutions such as the new
European Patent Court33 are notable examples of such adaptation,
as is the rise of sequential IP plurilateralism.34 Still, other versions
of legal innovation are evident in administrative plans and policies
that identify the strategic priorities of bureaucracies ostensibly
charged with protecting national IP interests, such as the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).35
What appears to unite efforts at legal innovation across
developed and developing countries is the promotion of
“bureaucratized and judicialized governance[,]” 36 which is
innovation distinctively associated with administrative agencies
and courts. These institutions are typically imbued with broad
discretionary powers and they have far less defined obligations to
the primacy or coherence of the multilateral IP system. Within this
IP ecosystem established by the WTO TRIPS Agreement, legal
innovation offers a fine instrument for defining sovereign
responsibility for the effects of IP rights in society across both
developed and developing countries.
Courts in the U.S., for example, have issued a series of opinions
that clearly are in tension with the maximalist narrative of the
TRIPS Agreement. 37 As Professor Jerome Reichman has noted,
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
Council Agreement 16351/12, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013
O.J. (C175) 1.
34 See infra Part 5.
35 See e.g., USPTO 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, supra note 29 (outlining the goals
of optimizing patent and trademark quality and timeliness and providing
domestic and global leadership to improve IP policy, protection, and
enforcement).
36 See Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, supra note 22, at 2,
10–14 (describing dynamic regulatory changes in transnational legal ordering,
such as the shift in the “authority of institutions within the state”).
37 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2120 (2013) (holding that a composition involving isolated DNA was not patent
eligible); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–31 (2010) (holding that a business
32
33
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developing countries would fare well by imitating U.S. approaches
in key areas affecting the supply of public goods, such as educating
its citizens, 38 encouraging competition 39 or otherwise expanding
the public domain.40 Certainly, U.S. policy in these areas is far less
maximalist than what some least-developed countries have been
led to implement as TRIPS-compliant legislation.41
It is important to note, however, that legal innovation is not
always a one-way positive gain for public welfare.42 The difficulty
in assessing which normative tradeoffs make sense in pursuit of
the vision of the domestic public good, as reflected in the dominant
economic justification for IP, is one critical reason for underscoring
the importance of legal innovation by domestic actors. The classic
IP economic narrative is not a complete representation of the
complex processes that qualify as innovation. Values such as
liberty, freedom of speech, equality and privacy also weigh
importantly in the technological choices made by private firms to
attract consumers to use technology and they should matter in
how countries construct the scope and exercise of IP rights.43 More
method of hedging financial losses in energy industry is not patent eligible); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)
(holding that a medical diagnostic method that added administering steps to a
natural correlation was not patent eligible); see also infra Part 1.2.2. for additional
discussions on the above cases.
38 See e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing a
Transnational System of Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 143, 162 (2007)
(arguing that developing countries would benefit from “experimentally . . . testing
different approaches to stimulating and disseminating innovation in their national
and regional systems of innovation and to defining the relevant supporting legal
standards that could prove effective for different players at different levels of
development . . . .”).
39 See e.g., Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 3, at 387–88
(predicting that IP regimes that are compliant with TRIPS, but that also stimulate
competition in developing countries will allow small and medium sized firms in
developing countries to align interests across the globe and create greater
competitive forces for larger firms).
40 See e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279,
316–20 (2004) (arguing that continued advancements in global technology are
dependent on a functional transnational system of innovation, especially
maintaining access to public knowledge goods and inputs).
41 DEERE, supra note 8.
42
Professor Julie Cohen has noted that the very arguments that advance
access to knowledge can often be in tension with some social freedoms and can
compromise privacy interests. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2002).
43 Id.
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importantly, in the information society, innovation may flourish
best precisely because there are no IP rights to control or repress the
creative impulses of ordinary citizens. Social media platforms, for
example, operate less on exclusive rights over content and more on
models that control how users function or experience these
technological spaces. 44 The TRIPS Agreement does not, and
cannot, provide specific rules to regulate these technologically
mediated social spaces, nor can it direct the ways in which an
absence of IP rights could engender innovation. As a result, the
extraordinary focus in the TRIPS Agreement on control for IP
owners and the mandatory baseline that effectually transfers the
locus of public policy decisions to private firms will regularly
require – and motivate – new ways of conceptualizing TRIPS
obligations at the national level.
1.2.

A Critique of Harmonization and Enforcement as Crowning
Triumphs

The TRIPS Agreement requires member countries to establish
certain minimum, albeit robust, standards of protection for the
traditional subjects of industrial property and copyright covered
by the Paris and Berne Conventions.45 It also includes, for the first
time, multilateral protection for undisclosed information 46 and
strengthens protection for layout designs47 beyond the terms of the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits
(IPIC Treaty). 48 These new rules largely brought a measure of
convergence between developed countries, although important
differences remained. 49
Undoubtedly, the new normative
standards alone were important improvements to the previous
44
For example, there is no doubt that many activities on Facebook may
constitute violations of copyright; yet, the capacity to engage in such activities is
what makes social media socially meaningful. Id. However, as Professor Cohen
argues, this is not necessarily a positive turn. See generally id. at 3–61.
45 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 27, 27.1; see also Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards, supra note 3 (noting the prevailing protectionist bias currently
shaping the international intellectual property arena).
46 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39.
47 Id. art. 38.
48 Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 28 I.L.M.
1484, May 26, 1989.
49 Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 90–93 (1997).
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multilateral regime administered by WIPO. Nonetheless, they
would not have significantly advanced the goal to impose
discipline on the national IP choices of the developing countries,
particularly middle-income countries such as India and Brazil,
whose economies and firms had proven capable of competing with
the IP-intensive sectors of the developed countries.
The piece de resistance of the TRIPS framework was a
mechanism to discipline and constrain the policy space that
facilitated cheap knowledge acquisition, such as through
differentiated levels of protection for IP subject matter. In order to
be effective, this mechanism had to threaten, in a credible way,
meaningful consequences for derogating from the newly
established normative framework. Accordingly, provisions for
enforcement and dispute settlement, including an outline of
prescriptive and administrative legal tools countries should make
available to rightsholders, 50 were the crown jewels of the TRIPS
Agreement.51 Finally, the Agreement arguably flattened the world
by adopting the hefty non-discrimination principles of National
Treatment (NT) and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN).52
These incredible changes to the international IP system were
based almost entirely on a foundation of untested assumptions in
both the IP and trade disciplines, with short-term sectoral interests
and political expediency as the primary checks on the negotiating
demands and eventual compromises agreed to at the Uruguay
Round. With little to no knowledge, data or other evidence about
the dynamic, long-term costs of IP harmonization for innovation
and competitive growth, even for markets in the developed
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 41–61.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]
(outlining new rules for enforcing intellectual property and settling disputes); see,
e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
275, 277 (1997) (arguing that dispute settlement in the WTO, with adjustments,
can be transferrable to controversies regarding intellectual property); see also Ruth
L. Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dispute
Settlement, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSES OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS 42 (E. Kwan Choi & James C.
Hartigan eds., 2005) [hereinafter Okediji, Rules of Power] (arguing that transferring
the enforcement methods of the WTO to intellectual property rules outlined in the
TRIPs Agreement is a marked benefit); Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and
the Sources of (International) Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 587
(2001) [hereinafter Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement].
52 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3–4.
50
51
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countries, the TRIPS Agreement created a garish monument to the
reality of sectoral bargains and domestic pay-offs that had long
been characteristic of multilateral free trade bargains.53 It did so by
attempting to consolidate and freeze in time existing gains of the
technological frontier and the IP legal baseline of developed
countries.
The Uruguay Round Final Agreement 54 thus introduced two
extraordinary realities to the world of international IP relations.
First, the TRIPS Agreement portrayed IP regimes as insulated from
demands for accountability to a larger global public law
framework, thus framing domestic policy options as either “pro”
or “anti” the objectives and requirements of TRIPS.55 However,
setting the mandatory TRIPS obligations and flexibilities in such
binary terms ignores the significant amount of creativity that takes
place in the carefully constructed spaces where control and access
are effectively balanced. Further, it disregards the extent to which
access to technology and cultural goods materially affects
individual exercises of social and political rights vital to innovation
and creativity. As leading IP commentators and economists have
long argued, the relationship between the production and use of
knowledge cannot be sensibly divorced from the equality-related
aspirations that define most of the societies in which IP rights have
been an important part of economic and political flourishing.56
Second, the TRIPS Agreement established a bartering regime
for the domestic public welfare goals associated with IP through
the celebrated Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).57 Now
commonly known, exchanging heightened IP standards for
concessions in trade, and even bargaining over non-compliance with
Finger, supra note 28.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994; THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 2 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M.
1143 (1994).
55
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global
Intellectual Property Norms, 39 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 69 (2008) (arguing that
disconnecting IP regimes from broader social and political contexts may lead to an
unworkable and fragmented legal framework, citing the Uruguay Round
Agreement as an illustration).
56 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 58–59 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as
the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361–63 (1999).
57 DSU, supra note 51; see also Okediji, Rules of Power, supra note 51; Okediji,
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51.
53
54
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TRIPS or WTO obligations, has become a feature of modern IP
relations.58 Arguably, the possibility that member nations can pay
for non-compliance with their international IP obligations suggests
the incomplete nature of IP’s most ambitious harmonization.
Certainly, the TRIPS Agreement has not produced the
normative stability many imagined, desired or feared. This
outcome is largely attributed to a spate of judicial opinions in the
developed countries themselves where courts have repeatedly
drawn limits on a variety of IP claims for reasons ranging from
freedom of competition to human rights59 and the utilitarian logic
of the IP system.60 A number of disputes before the WTO have also
illustrated the degree to which developed countries differed in
their own approaches to the various standards set forth in TRIPS.61
Ultimately, even the TRIPS text itself reflects incomplete
harmonization. In several instances where legal or policy
approaches between developed countries could not be overcome
during negotiations, flexibility in how normative principles should
be implemented was clearly expressed in the Agreement. 62
Ongoing disputes63 will continue to test the extent to which such
58 The most recent example is the U.S.—Antigua dispute over the latter’s
failure to comply with a WTO ruling. Panel Report, United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW
(Mar. 30, 2007); see also Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter United States—Section
110(5)] (noting that a Member may request authorization to suspend concessions
or obligations under Article 22 of the DSU).
59 See e.g., Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 2599 (Oct. 18, 2011) (banning patents on procedures involving the
destruction of human embryos).
60 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109
(2013) (explaining that without the rule that laws of nature are not patentable
subject matter, “there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents
would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation
premised upon them.’” (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012)).
61 United States: Section 110(5), supra note 58; see also Convention on the Grant
of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254, as revised Nov. 29,
2000, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013
/e/ar52.html (defining patentable subject matter in the European Union); Patent
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 (Can.) (defining patentable subject matter in Canada).
62
See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31 (“Where the law of a
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties
authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected[.]”).
63 One example is a current dispute under the North American Free Trade
Agreement’s (NAFTA) IP Chapter between Eli Lilly and the Canadian
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flexibility remains a legal reality in multilateral IP relations.
1.3.

Patent Harmonization in the TRIPS Agreement and
Competitive Equilibrium

Most commentary on the TRIPS Agreement has focused on the
minimum standards introduced, especially with respect to patents,
where negotiations were the most difficult. Here, the Agreement
established minimum standards of patentability rather than relying
on domestic law, like the Paris Convention.64 It expressly included
process patents and, as noted by Professor Daniel Gervais, made
any limits on patentable subject matter exceptional, thereby
establishing protectability as the rule.65 Moreover, a new rule not
previously in the Paris Convention required patent applicants to
describe inventions in a manner sufficiently “clear and complete”
to ensure a person skilled in the art could replicate the invention.66
government over the latter’s ‘promise of the patent’ doctrine. See Kazi Stastna, Eli
Lilly Files $500M NAFTA Suit Against Canada over Drug Patents, CBC NEWS (Sept.
13, 2014, 8:44 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/eli-lilly-files-500m-naftasuit-against-canada-over-drug-patents-1.1829854. Most commentators agree that
this flexibility has been an integral component of international IP law and policy,
both regional and multilateral. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Remarks at the
108th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Compliance
of Canada’s Utility Doctrine with International Minimum Standards of Patent
Protection (2014); Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v.
Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121
(2014).
64 Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.4 (“Patents shall include the various
kinds of industrial patents recognized by the laws of the countries of the
Union . . . .”).
65 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
(3d ed. 2008).
66 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 29. This is equivalent to the PHOSITA
standard in the U.S. Despite the important disclosure function such a rule
purports to advance, there are important normative challenges with constructing
a hypothetical person skilled in the art that could carry out the invention and thus
justify the information-for-protection bargain. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1196 (2002)
(noting that there are “several structural barriers that make it difficult for courts to
accurately assess the level of skill in a complex technological art” and that judges
and their law clerks are generally “at a rather serious disadvantage in trying to
put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist”); see also, e.g.,
Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2009) (noting that the interpretation of PHOSITA has
transformed from merely practicing an art to researching and discovering new
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This development expressed the stylized bargain between the
inventor and the public that historically animated patent law
policy in industrialized countries.67 Finally, the patent provisions
included a general exception in Article 30, 68 modeled after the
three-step test found in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. 69
Other important provisions include Article 31, which set
safeguards on compulsory licensing, and Article 33, which
harmonized patent terms to twenty years from the date of filing.70
Importantly, TRIPS eliminated any discrimination based on where
the invention occurred, including prohibiting discrimination based
on whether the invention was locally produced or imported.71
Understanding the breadth of changes occasioned by the TRIPS
Agreement in international patent law requires an appreciation of
how non-discrimination norms recalibrated the competitive
opportunities of technology-intensive firms. As noted earlier, the
Agreement’s chief accomplishments were to supply and tighten
the standards not adequately covered by previous IP instruments,
and to link these ambitious reforms of the multilateral system with
the reality and pain of trade sanctions. However, the absence of
strong institutions in most developing countries, the relatively thin
policy contexts in which IP rights exist, and the stark power
imbalances in global economic affairs justifiably raised developing
countries’ anxiety about potential adverse consequences of a oneway ratchet of IP rights.
In short, concerns about the baseline established in the TRIPS
Agreement for terms of access to knowledge goods remain deeply
problematic in development circles.72 These concerns are certainly
and improved methods within that art). In addition to being a peculiarly
discipline-specific standard, it is hard to imagine that a construction exists that
could meaningfully equalize the social tradeoffs of the patent bargain when an
invention is sought in a developing country on the same terms as it may have
been obtained in a developed country.
67 Id.
68 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 30.
69 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
70 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 31, 33.
71 Id. art. 27.1.
72 These concerns remain strong in copyright law, where the consequences of
policy decisions restricting access to cultural or knowledge goods may not be felt
for at least one generation. Prevailing economic wisdom suggests that suboptimal
access to education, as an example, will produce an uneducated or ill-educated
citizenry with corresponding challenges to a country’s capacity to absorb
technology, ultimately compromising its socio-economic trajectory. See ANTHONY
CREE, ANDREW KAY & JUNE STEWARD, WORLD LITERACY FOUND., THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COST OF ILLITERACY: A SNAPSHOT OF ILLITERACY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (2012),

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

OKEDIJI (DO NOT DELETE)

208

3/18/2015 5:36 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:1

justified in light of the unremitting efforts to further populate the
multilateral arena with new IP agreements that seek to expand
private control over critical inputs necessary for the supply of
public goods. As I describe later, authentic legal innovation
illustrates that the same space within the TRIPS Agreement that
was constructed to give countries room to enhance or strengthen
TRIPS obligations can be reconstituted to give countries room to
experiment with tools designed to extract welfare gains from the
local environments in which the Agreement must operate.73 The
ease with which the space to enhance IP rights is transformed into
space to advance social welfare will be largely dependent on the
nature of the tools of innovation that are utilized – legal
institutions and processes, political fiat, policy instruments or
appeals to higher normative claims.
2. INDUCING LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELATIONS
Part 2 provides an overview of various structural and
substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, focusing in
particular on foundational patent limitations. Next, it provides a
short explanation of how these provisions, along with the general
infrastructure of the Agreement, have jointly defined the contours
of legal innovation in developing countries.
2.1.

Legal Innovation and the Pillars of the TRIPS Agreement

Three main features of the TRIPS Agreement appear, more than
most, to have generated intense pressure on the welfare goals of
WTO member states. These features are directly responsible for
motivating legal innovation in the developing countries and
resistance in some developed countries. They are: (i) nonavailable
at
http://www.worldliteracyfoundation.org/The_Economic_&_Social_Cost_of_Illit
eracy.pdf (linking illiteracy with difficulty in achieving technological literacy);
Philip Stevens & Martin Weale, Nat’l Inst. of Econ. & Soc. Research, Education and
Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION
(Geraint
Johnes
&
Jill
Johnes
eds.,
2004),
available
at
http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/
7087576.pdf
(exploring
the
connection between education and economic growth).
73 See supra Part 2.1.4.
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discrimination principles, (ii) scope of protection and (iii) sanctions
and enforcement.

2.1.1.

The Flawed Architecture of the TRIPS Agreement: NonDiscrimination

It is well known that the international IP world prior to TRIPS
was rife with protectionist measures in favor of domestic
innovators and markets.
Examples of historic and recent
discrimination in procedural, administrative and evidentiary
standards exist both in the U.S. and in other countries. 74 Such
discrimination is explicitly justified as protectionist measures for
local industries, but it is also justified by the important goal of
promoting access to the class of knowledge goods at issue for the
benefit of broader societal objectives.
The difficulty with a blunt non-discrimination rule as it exists
in the TRIPS Agreement lies with the challenge of making ex ante
determinations over which policy options designed to restore
market equilibrium will, instead, distort it. Even in the advanced
economies, there is significant uncertainty about when an exclusive
right will serve purely monopolistic conditions, thus harming
competition and markets, or when it will meaningfully reward
74 Discrimination against foreign authors was a key feature of early U.S.
copyright policy to aid in the development of a literate and educated society by
ensuring cheap access to European literature. It was not until the Copyright Act
of 1891 that the U.S. extended copyright protection to works of non-U.S.
domiciled foreign authors, so long as their home countries accorded comparable
protection to works of U.S. authors. The Act also extended protection to works of
foreign authors if the U.S. joined an international agreement requiring reciprocal
protection of the works of citizens from countries party to the agreement.
However, protection for foreign authors and U.S. authors was conditioned on the
production of their works within the U.S. (the so-called manufacturing clause).
See Copyright Act of 1891, § 3, 26 Stat. 1106, 1007 (1891) (stating rules and policies
governing whether a foreign author’s work is capable of being copyrighted).
Later amendments narrowed the scope of the manufacturing clause, but it
remained in force until July 1, 1986. In more recent history, evidence of foreign
inventive activity was excluded as prior art under the U.S. Patent Act. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006) (repealed 2011) (limiting the use of prior inventive
activity to inventions “made in this country[,]” i.e., the United States). However,
such geographic discrimination was eliminated under the new first-to-file system
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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innovation and incentivize future investment in research and
development (R&D). 75 The dynamic nature of technological
change, prospects of market failure, and changes in other
macroeconomic variables also mean that policy adjustments may
themselves occasion unintended effects not easily susceptible to
judgment as violations of the elusive competitive balance TRIPS
sought to codify.76
Articles 3 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement dampen the ability of
countries to engage in overt distinctions between foreign and
domestic innovators and creators. The NT and MFN rules prohibit
the application of different standards and normative rules with
regard to the forms of IP available under domestic law and as
between third countries and other WTO members.77 An immediate
consequence of the NT and MFN rules is that developing countries
cannot respond to local innovation by adjusting IP rules to reflect
development levels as the developed countries historically did.78
Moreover, non-discrimination principles eliminate the possibility
that policy initiatives can target local innovation exclusively
without triggering fears of trade reprisals under the WTO. Of
course, for the developed countries, such targeted policies are also
proscribed, creating significant pressure to utilize forms of indirect
favoritism through explicit regulatory schemes to promote
domestic innovation, such as in the Bayh-Dole Act.79
The fixed costs associated with investments in research and
innovation are much more complex and difficult to pin down than
instances of discrimination. Accordingly, preferential treatment
for domestic innovators tends to remain unexamined for possible
violations of minimum international standards. But even in those
75 Stiglitz, supra note 5 (describing consequences of information asymmetries
on the neoclassical market equilibrium model in different areas, and noting the
need for government intervention in policies regulating knowledge acquisition).
76 Id.
77 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3–4; see also id. art. 27.1.
78 Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will
the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115 (2009) [hereinafter
Reichman, Twenty-First Century] (noting that developed countries, such as the
U.S., started with far lower levels of protection than exist today).
79 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified in 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–212) (permitting universities, non-profits, and small business to
pursue ownership of inventions arising from federally-funded research).
Historically, developing countries have lacked the capacity for similarly
discriminatory regulatory schemes but this is changing. See generally Greg
Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State (Fourth Biennial Global
Conference of the Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law (SIEL), Working Paper No. 2014/29,
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2480664.
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cases where discriminatory claims arise from legal rules directed to
address unique domestic interests, such as the European
Community’s challenge to the Fairness in Music Licensing Act,80
developed economies have turned to a range of responses to
deflect and defend against intrusive or disruptive obligations
required by the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, as I discuss later, when
faced with political stakes, developed countries may simply choose
noncompliance with international obligations as a way to satisfy
domestic interest group demands. Whether developing countries
have the political will to confront these instances of discriminatory
policies in the developed countries is uncertain, even in cases
where the developed nations’ practice of favoring local innovators
is a clear violation of the TRIPS non-discrimination principles. 81
As I have argued before, pursuing enforcement of TRIPS
obligations is not a politically costless exercise.82 Choosing not to
confront such examples of discrimination could reflect political
wisdom, preserve developing countries’ own domestic
discriminatory practices (or the opportunity to design them) and
supply developing countries with strategic leverage in later battles
with the developed countries.
2.1.2.

Legal Innovation and the Prohibition on Discrimination

It should be no surprise that discriminatory treatment remains
pervasive in multilateral IP relations. The TRIPS Agreement may
have blunted the worst cases of discrimination between local and
foreign inventors, but the mandate to treat innovators equally puts
pressure on the very basis for competitive advantage in globally
integrated markets. Countries at all levels of development have
adopted a range of measures and practices to safeguard domestic
industries from foreign competition and to distinguish domestic
80 United States: Section 110(5), supra note 58 (finding that 17 U.S.C. § 110(5),
known as the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, permits, under certain conditions,
the playing of radio and television music in public places without the payment of
a royalty fee inconsistent with Articles 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement).
81
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (highlighting the explicit preference for
domestic innovation in the Bayh-Dole Act – for example, see § 204, entitled
“Preference for United States Industry”). This arguably is an impermissible
subsidy under the GATT rules. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) (stating factors and rules to
determine whether a subsidy is permissible).
82 Okediji, Rules of Power, supra note 51.
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innovators – and by proxy domestic welfare concerns - from the
constraints of the TRIPS Agreement. Some legislative initiatives,
such as the U.S expansion of prior user rights, 83 make explicit
distinctions between U.S. and foreign inventors and are arguably a
violation of TRIPS.84 Other measures, such as a reduction in patent
application fees, are less clearly objectionable.85 Partly, it is how
discrimination occurs that may make it more acceptable to trading
partners rather than whether countries discriminate in favor of their
citizens. The micro-entity fee reduction in the AIA, for example,
applies to foreign natural persons but not foreign universities, even
though U.S. universities can qualify for the discount. 86 This
ingenious distinction is legal innovation at its finest; an
international rule is arguably violated, but not in a way that would
justify the economic or political costs of the WTO dispute process.
One clear consequence of the TRIPS non-discrimination norms,
then, has been to divert discriminatory practices to institutional
processes, similar to the micro-entity provision of the AIA
mentioned above. Various examples occur in other IP subject
matter categories and outside the legislative context. For example,
in copyright cases, courts often adopt choice of law rules that
prioritize the ability of American plaintiffs to exploit their works in
foreign territories, regardless of the applicability of the copyright
law of the foreign country. 87 Another example is the European
Patent Office Enlarged Board of Appeals decision in University
Patents v. SmithKline Beecham, which gave the facially neutral
Article 55 of the European Patent Convention a somewhat
discriminatory effect, as the provision’s six month grace period is
35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).
Dennis Crouch, How the AIA Violates TRIPS, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 28, 2012),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/how-the-aia-violates-trips.html
(noting
that the expanded prior user rights are not available as a defense to a charge of
infringement lodged by a U.S. university).
85 Id.
86 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, § 11(g), 125 Stat. 284
(2011); see also Crouch, supra note 84 (arguing that discrimination between U.S.
and foreign universities with respect to fee reduction may pass muster if it is
construed as a subsidy. However, it is ambiguous whether the distinction
between a fee discount and a subsidy matters in the context of unfair trade
measures under WTO rules).
87 See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1999)
(contending that U.S. Courts utilize choice of law strategies in order to apply U.S.
copyright law to claims of copyright infringement that occurred abroad).
83
84
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measured from the actual filing date of the European Patent
Application, not any earlier Paris Convention priority date to
which an applicant is otherwise entitled.88 Thus, applicants who
file in a home country first and seek to take advantage of Paris
Convention priority would not be able to benefit from the grace
period.89
Of course, diversion to institutional processes may backfire,
requiring costly political actions. The Obama Administration’s
veto90 of the International Trade Commission’s exclusion order91 in
the Samsung and Apple patent dispute92 is a recent example of a
facially neutral procedure that potentially reflects significant
discriminatory impetus in favor of a U.S. firm.93 The complexity of
regulating standard essential patents makes this particular instance
difficult to present as an unequivocal case of discriminatory policy
in favor of a local firm. But this is, of course, precisely the point of
the argument: it is highly improbable that governments can tell ex
ante whether a particular policy designed to address domestic
Case G-3/98, University Patents, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Biologicals
SA
(Eur.
Pat.
Office
Enlarged
Bd.
App.
2000),
available
at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/g980003ex1.pdf.
89 Id. My thanks to Margo Bagley for pointing this out to me.
90 Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon.
Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013 %20Letter_1.PDF (vetoing
USITC’s decision).
91
Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Commc’n Devices, Portable
Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794
(June 4, 2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/
337/337-794_ notice06042013sgl.pdf (awarding in favor of Samsung and imposing
a limited ban on importation and sales of certain Apple products).
92 Litigation between the two companies has expanded to over fifty disputes
in ten different countries, with potential damages of over $1 billion. See, e.g.,
Australian Court to Fast-track Samsung Appeal on Tablet Ban, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2011,
12:59 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/27/us-applesamsung-australia-idUSTRE79Q0SN20111027 (chronicling the ongoing patent
dispute between Samsung and Apple in Australia and other significant countries
in 2011); Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple Are Suing Each Other,
PC
MAG.
(Sept.
14,
2011,
12:59
PM),
available
at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2392920,00.asp (noting the many
countries where Samsung and Apple are currently engaged in patent disputes).
93 This implicates a broader question of whether injunctive relief should be
available for infringement of standard essential patents. See generally NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013).
88
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market imperfections will, instead, confer unjustifiable market
power or competitive advantage to local firms and sectors.
Moreover, even within the traditional jurisprudence of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), not every form of
discrimination was proscribed.94 The TRIPS Agreement offers no
similar guidance to governments regarding how IP policy can be
used explicitly in permissible discriminatory fashion, what forms
such discrimination can take in order to accommodate local needs,
what domestic market conditions may justify interventionist
policies, and what the nature and timeframe of those policies
should be.
Another approach to legal innovation with regard to the WTO
non-discrimination rules (and indeed all other rules) is noncompliance with globally agreed norms as interpreted by the
dispute settlement process. Non-compliance with a panel or
Appellate Body decision could be viewed as a choice available to
powerful states willing and able to risk the reputational (and other)
effects of violations of agreed upon international rules. In regard
to the TRIPS Agreement, however, non-compliance is better
viewed as a form of legal innovation that, in the short term,
internalizes the political costs of derogation from TRIPS obligations
or transfers those costs to other policy arenas or agencies.95
For example, in U.S.-Section 211 Appropriations Act,96 otherwise
known as the “Havana Club Rum” dispute, the EU filed a
complaint alleging that § 211 of the 1998 Omnibus Appropriations
Act was a violation of the TRIPS Agreement. This provision
prohibited the registration or renewal in the United States of a
trademark if it was previously abandoned by an owner whose
business and assets had been confiscated under Cuban law. 97
94 For example, GATT permits “the charging by a state enterprise of different
prices for its sales of a product in different markets . . . provided that such
different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply
and demand in export markets." See Interpretative Note to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVII.
95 See, e.g., Ana Radelat, Cuba Appeals to USPTO in Battle to Keep Control of
Havana Club Rum Trademark, CUBA NEWS (July 1, 2012), available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Cuba+appeals+to+USPTO+in+
battle+to+keep+control+of+Havana+Club+rum...-a0301479927 (discussing the
conundrum faced by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
when asked by Cuba to suspend cancelation of its trademark registration until the
embargo is abolished).
96 Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act
of
1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R
(Jan.
2,
2002),
available
at
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds176_e.htm.
97 Id. ¶¶ 3–7, at 1–5.
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Moreover, no U.S. court could recognize or enforce the assertion of
such rights.98 Despite a finding by the WTO Appellate Body that
§ 211 violates the NT and MFN obligations of the TRIPS
Agreement,99 the U.S has not complied with the ruling, which has
in turn been the subject of on-going discussions 100 at the WTO
TRIPS Council.101 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the
matter, 102 leaving the question of U.S compliance with its
international obligations squarely with the political process. Such
constructive disengagement with the multilateral process in the
face of unyielding national political considerations is also a form of
legal innovation.
2.1.3.

Legal Innovation and Scope of Patentable Subject Matter
Under TRIPS

On scope of IP subject matter, the most important change for
patents under the TRIPS Agreement occurred via Article 27. This
Article requires countries to make patents available in all fields of
technology, provided that the inventions are “new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application,” unless
commercial exploitation of the invention would violate, among
other things, “ordre public or morality . . . .” 103 Though this
provision eliminated the possibility of significant limits on
patentable subject matter, there is evidence that Article 27 is not an

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 258–68, at 74–77.
100 See EU, Cuba Spar with US over ‘Havana Club’ Rum, EUBUSINESS, (June 25,
2013, 10:08 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/wto-cuba-us-patent.pet
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (discussing controversy stemming from the US’ “failure
to void a trademark law” despite the WTO striking down this law over 10 years
prior to the controversy).
101
The TRIPS Council, which is open to all members of the WTO, is
responsible for administering the TRIPS Agreement. Work of the TRIPS Council,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/
intel6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
102 See generally Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d
Cir. 2000).
103 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 27(1)–(2). The TRIPS Agreement
also contains additional exceptions such as diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
methods, plants, animals other than microorganisms, and “essentially biological
processes.” Id. art. 27(3).
98
99
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unbounded carte blanche to industry, 104 nor does it appear to
inhibit constitutionally-driven policy limits to patents.105 The U.S.
Supreme Court has creatively interpreted important policy bases
for limiting patent subject matter eligibility in controversial cases
involving new technologies.106 As I have argued elsewhere, the
role of local institutions in balancing the incentive to
commercialize innovation with interests underlying the distinctive
policy goals of the patent system to promote the progress of society
has been steadily redefined in recent years. 107 Indeed, leading
patent law scholars have noted that there is increasingly less
consistency among both developed and developing countries on
issues of patent subject matter eligibility. 108 Consequently,
important room for legal innovation exists within the context of
Article 27.
Innovative responses by courts to an enlargement of patent
GERVAIS, supra note 65, at 341–53.
See, e.g., Ass’n for Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117
(2013) (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-Gen., Petition No. 409
of
2009,
(H.C.K.)
(Kenya),
available
at
http://www.escrnet.org/sites/default/files/Judgment-Petition-No-409-of-2009
%20Anti%20counterfeit%20case.pdf (holding that the Anti-Counterfeit Act
violated the Kenyan Constitution because it precluded access to essential
medicines and therefore infringed the fundamental right of life, human dignity,
and health).
106 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2116 (2013) (“As we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a
delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and
discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed
spur, invention.’”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010) (“If a high enough
bar is not set when considering patent applications of this sort, patent examiners
and courts could be flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative
endeavor and dynamic change.”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012) (“[T]here is a danger that the grant of patents . . .
will inhibit future innovation premised upon them . . . .”).
107
Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the International Patent System, in
PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds.,
2014) [hereinafter Okediji, Public Welfare].
108 See generally Margo A. Bagley, Patent Barbarians at the Gate: The Who, What,
When, Where, Why and How of US Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Disputes, in
PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 149, 150, 185 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A.
Bagley eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bagley, Patent Barbarians]; Dan L. Burk, Patent Law’s
Problem Children: Software and Biotechnology in Transatlantic Context, in PATENT LAW
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 187, 212 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014).
104
105
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rights have not been limited to the developed world. In a seminal
case on the African continent, Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-General, the
Kenyan High Court overturned a TRIPS-driven anti-counterfeiting
statute 109 strongly supported by the United States and the
pharmaceutical sector 110 in order to preserve access to generic
medicines. 111 The Court explained that the statute did not
sufficiently distinguish between counterfeit drugs and generic
medicines, thus undermining the fundamental human right to
health (i.e., access to affordable life-saving drugs) guaranteed by
the Kenyan Constitution.112
Outside the judicial context, biodiversity-rich countries such as
China, India and Brazil have enacted laws that limit access to
biological and genetic resources. These laws are specifically
designed to encourage downstream IP owners to share the benefits
gained from such resources with the providing country or
indigenous communities. 113 These innovations through the
legislative process lie at the intersection of patent and
environmental protection regimes, introducing new and critically
important dimensions to national patent policies. Even further,
they have injected new momentum into negotiations at WIPO for
an international instrument mandating disclosure of source in
patent applicants when genetic resources have been used in the
inventive process. 114 Although the precise scope of such an
The Anti-Counterfeit Act, No. 13 (2008), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No.
97, 261 (Kenya).
110
See, e.g., Suleiman Mbatiah, KENYA: Pharmaceutical Companies Pushing
Anti-Counterfeit Law, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (June 14, 2010),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/kenya-pharmaceutical-companies-pushinganti-counterfeit-law (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (discussing the important role that
multinational pharmaceutical companies played in Kenya’s anti-counterfeit law);
World Anti-Counterfeit Day, U.S. EMBASSY BLOG: NAIROBI (June 12, 2012),
http://blogs.usembassy.gov/nairobi/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (discussing how
the U.S. embassy in Kenya has worked to promote the Anti-Counterfeit Act).
111 Asero Ochieng, Petition No. 409 of 2009, supra note 105.
112
Id. ¶¶ 75–78.
113
Bagley, Patent Barbarians, supra note 108, at 176.
114 The IGC, created by WIPO in 2000, held its first session in 2001 to discuss
IP protection for genetic resources (GRs), traditional knowledge (TK), and
traditional cultural expressions (TCEs). World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO],
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore [hereinafter IGC], 1st Sess., WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1
(Apr.
30–May
3,
2001),
available
at
http://wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=4295. The IGC’s current
109
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international disclosure requirement remains highly contested, the
geopolitical space already subject to a disclosure requirement is
significant.
If successful at WIPO, the work of the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) will
represent a seminal international agreement springing from the
national laws of the major emerging economies. It will also
reinforce the growing need for multilateral IP norms to align with
relevant international regimes or face being disrupted when those
norms invariably become a part of national obligations in key
countries.
Already the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD),115 which recognizes sovereign rights over natural resources
in member states, and the recent entry into force of the Nagoya
Protocol,116 have engendered a powerful set of international norms

mandate from WIPO is to work on “text-based negotiations . . . [to] reach[] [an]
agreement on a text(s) of an international legal instruments(s) which will ensure
the effective protection of GRs, TK, and TCEs.” WIPO, Matters Concerning the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), 43rd Sess., at Annex D, 2, WIPO Doc.
WO/GA/43/14
(Aug.
14,
2013),
available
at
http://wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ ga_43/wo_ga_43_14.pdf. The
most recent twenty-sixth session was held in February 2014. WIPO, IGC, 26th
Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/26 (Feb. 3–7, 2014), available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=31362.
The latest
draft text on genetic sources was submitted to the WIPO General Assembly in
September 2014. See generally WIPO, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources (Rev. 2), WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/26 (Feb. 7,
2014), available at http://wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=267381;
see also WIPO, IGC 26 Update: Negotiators Advance on Text on IP & Genetic Resources,
IGC
NEWS
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/news/
igc/2014/news_0004.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (briefing the progress at the
IGC’s 26th session). However, the Assemblies could not agree on any further
progress on text-based work.
115 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
116
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (ensuring that
indigenous or source communities are involved in the process by which materials
and knowledge harvested from their environments are used); see also Catherine
Saez, Nagoya Protocol Enters into Force, Will Be Tested in Months to Come, IP WATCH
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/10/09/nagoya-protocol-entersinto-force-will-be-tested-in-months-to-come/ (explaining the defining features of
the protocol and highlighting potential points of regulatory friction in the
international community).
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that govern an important area of technological developments.117
It is unlikely that the multilateral IP system can remain aloof
from such muscular regimes. What is more, it is imprudent for the
system to fail to consider how national innovation addressed
through other regulatory processes can cohere with the IP
framework. Regardless of whether the IGC process is successful,
the rate of innovation and patent filings in countries such as
India, 118 China 119 and Brazil 120 suggest that, whether or not
knowledge from developing countries is formally internalized in
the multilateral IP system, innovation based on traditional bodies
of knowledge will invariably affect the strategies and practices of
IP firms. The emerging environment of the Nagoya Protocol and
implementing national rules will create a de facto integration of
those norms in the multilateral IP framework in a manner that is
unlikely to exalt IP rightsholders’ interests over domestic welfare
priorities.
2.1.4.

Legal Innovation and Enforcement

Most scholars agree that the possibility of effective
transnational IP enforcement was one of the major triumphs of the

117 The Nagoya Protocol establishes a legal framework for access and benefit
sharing regimes to ensure that indigenous or source communities are involved in
the complex web of innovation in which materials and knowledge harvested from
their environments are used. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 116, art. 1 (“The
objective of this Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
from the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to
genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate
funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components.”).
118 See Statistical Country Profiles: India, WIPO STAT. DATABASE (last updated
Mar.
2014),
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_
profile/countries/in.html (noting that patent filings in India exceeded 18,173
applications).
119
See Statistical Country Profiles: China, WIPO STAT. DATABASE,
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/ en/statistics/country _profile/countries/cn.html
(last updated Mar. 2014) (noting that patent filings in China exceeded 561,377
applications).
120 See Statistical Country Profiles: Brazil, WIPO STAT. DATABASE (last updated
Mar.
2014),
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country
_profile/countries/br.html (noting that patent filings in Brazil exceeded 6,597
applications).
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Uruguay Round, 121 giving countries an opportunity to sanction
violators of agreed provisions. 122 The TRIPS Agreement has
produced far less litigation between developed and developing
countries than anticipated; indeed, most of the disputes have been
between the developed countries, a trend few foresaw in 1994.123
Further, among these disputes, compliance has remained uneven,
especially by the U.S., which has yet to implement several panel
reports to date. 124 This limited data suggests that neither
determining what constitutes a TRIPS violation nor achieving
enforcement on the ground is a simple task.
Several reasons may explain the relative inactivity around
TRIPS enforcement and compliance.
First, the enforcement
provisions of TRIPS recognize the political costs of dispute
settlement and thus explicitly promote settlement outside the DSU
process. 125 Disputes between more powerful countries involve
gap-filling exercises in which policy differences between the two
are forcibly resolved, sometimes to provide political cover from
domestic interest group politics that may have constrained
appropriate compliance with the international norm.126
Between two differently situated countries, legal innovation in
dispute settlement may offer an opportunity to recalibrate
particular expectations or secure promises that have yet to
materialize in specific areas of international economic regulation.
The United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute between
Brazil and the United States, which resulted in permission for
Brazil to suspend TRIPS obligations to the U.S., is an example of
this strategic use of the DSU process. 127 Cotton subsidies have
historically been a sensitive trade issue for the U.S. 128 Similarly,
See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 51.
Id. at 277.
123 See generally Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51.
124
Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO
Compliance Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 411–12 (2011) (noting that the U.S.
has yet to correct its nine-year-old violations arising out of the Section 110(5) and
Havana Club Rum disputes).
125 Okediji, Rules of Power, supra note 51.
126 Ruth L. Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 89 (2000).
127
Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R
(Sept. 8, 2004).
128 Jasper Womach, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32442, COTTON PRODUCTION
AND SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2004) (“To stabilize and support farm
incomes, in the face of highly variable prices caused by fluctuating world supply
and demand conditions, major crops produced in the United States, including
121
122
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Brazil has a strong cotton industry and, like other developing
countries, a high interest in better access to agricultural markets as
part of the Uruguay Round bargain. 129 Bringing the WTO
complaint and defending it vigorously was a form of legal
innovation in itself and likely politically positive for both countries,
quite aside from the merits of the case. Though the stakes for both
countries were sufficiently high to justify the costs of undertaking
the DSU process, the risk of cross-retaliation against U.S. IP
industries was significant for the United States, which ultimately
reached a resolution with Brazil.130
Cross-retaliation in the TRIPS context leaves considerable
uncertainty about the general efficacy of the dispute settlement
process for developing countries, most of which have no
meaningful recourse to address WTO violations by the developed
countries.131 Whether cross-retaliation is a credible threat at least
partially depends on the relative influence of domestic interest
groups and IP-intensive industries on lawmakers.132 If the political
calculation of the complaining country is wrong about the clout of
domestic IP industries in the offending country generally, or of a
particular IP sector, permission by the WTO to cross-retaliate by
suspending TRIPS obligations is unlikely to produce compliance
cotton, have been subsidized since the 1930s.”).
129 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433,
451 (2002) (stating that Brazil advocated for the elimination of import restrictions
and export subsidies).
130 Steven Suppan, Unconditional Surrender: The U.S.-Brazil Deal to End WTOAuthorized Retaliation, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY, (Oct. 9, 2014)
http://www.iatp.org/blog/201410/unconditional-surrender-the-us-brazil-dealto-end-wto-authorized-retaliation.
131 See, e.g., Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an
Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403
(2000) (claiming that developing countries have few mechanisms for forcing
developed countries to comply with WTO obligations); Frederick M. Abbott,
Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries (Int’l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 8, 2009), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/06/cross-retaliation-in-trips.pdf (supporting
the claim that developing countries do not have equal bargaining power as
developing countries to enforce WTO obligations); see also Gabriel L. Slater, The
Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating
Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J.
1365, 1377 (2009) (asserting that developing countries have few enforcement tools
against developed countries, and advocating issuance of temporary compulsory
licenses or suspension of TRIPS obligations as an alternative).
132 Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 311, 340 (2011).
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by the offending country.
Moreover, suspending TRIPS
obligations is likely the least-preferred outcome of the WTO
complainant. 133 The credibility of a cross-retaliation threat with
regard to TRIPS can be limited by the sheer complexity of applying
criteria developed for goods (such as the principle that the level of
suspension be “equivalent”) to IP rights that are not easily
susceptible to valuation. 134 Moreover, even where a developing
country is able to satisfy the hefty requirements of DSU Article
22.3, 135 cross-retaliation under TRIPS can affect interests of
innocent countries, further complicating the political risks of crossretaliation as an enforcement option for the complainant.
Consider, for example, that ownership of copyright in a jointly
authored work belongs to an American author and a Brazilian
author. If the U.S. is the offending country, and cross-retaliation
against it has been authorized, how would suspension of copyright
protection in the work of joint-authorship by the WTO
complainant proceed? Particularly with cultural goods designed to
be easily de-anchored from their place of origin,136 determining the
national identity and value of the IP rights that can be suspended is
itself an exercise requiring immense analytical investment.137 In
addition to the complexity of determining economic value and to
which country ownership of an authorial work should be
attributed, the ease with which digital goods transcend borders
makes it exceptionally difficult to police where goods embodying
133 See generally Abbott, supra note 131; Yu, supra note 132 (arguing that the
negative economic impact caused from suspending obligations, and raising trade
barriers, would likely be much greater on developing countries than on
developed countries).
134 Werner Zdouc, Cross-Retaliation and Suspension Under the GATS and TRIPS
Agreement, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 515 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010).
135 DSU, supra note 51, art. 22.3.
136 Compare Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23,
37 (2003) (holding that unaccredited copying of material from the public domain
does not violate the Lanham Act, because “origin” of “goods” under Lanham Act
§ 43(a)(1)(A) refers to the producer of physical goods, rather than the creator of
the underlying creative expression embodied within those goods), with 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2012) (defining a “United States work” to include works first published
“simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation . . .” and works
published by United States nationals).
137
Frederick M. Abbott, Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Issues of Law and Practice,
in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
536 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010).
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suspended IP rights may end up and how they can be
distinguished in the market.138
The difficulties posed by cross-retaliation are not
insurmountable. In particular, Professor Frederick Abbott has
explored particular kinds of IP that could be the focus of crossretaliation. 139 Further, other benefits are obtainable from traderetaliation measures if the country’s market size makes such
retaliation feasible.140 Cross-retaliation holds seductive promise for
developing countries seeking to enforce trade obligations against
more powerful advanced economies. But, in choosing between
enforcement strategies directed at IP-intensive economies, the
power of IP industries, while significant, should not be the only
factor in deciding what would work best among a range of
retaliatory trade options.141 In short, the ineffectiveness of crossretaliation confirms the structural weakness of the bargain that
developing countries struck when they exchanged strong IP rights
for yet unfulfilled promises of access to agriculture markets, all the

138
A similar point was made by the arbitrators in the WTO arbitration
known as “Bananas III” (European Community v. Ecuador). “[I]nterference with
private property rights of individuals or companies may be perceived as more far
reaching under the TRIPS Agreement, given the potentially unlimited possibility
to copy phonograms or use other intellectual property rights.” Decision by the
Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas--Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of
the DSU (“Bananas III”), WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, ¶ 157 (Mar. 24, 2000); see also
Zdouc, supra note 134, at 524 (discussing the complexities of attributing
intellectual property rights to specific countries under the TRIPS Agreement).
139 See Abbott, Issues of Law and Practice, supra note 137, at 536 (explaining
how to cross-retaliate against the TRIPS agreement).
140 Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context:
What is the Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations?, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 34, 64-65 (Chad P. Bown &
Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010) (exploring the obvious retaliatory and complianceinducing goals of WTO suspension, but also concluding that the practice achieves
other “ancillary objectives” such as compliance, compensation or sanction).
141 But see Zdouc, supra note 134, at 525–26 (arguing that retaliation under
TRIPS may have a “snowball effect” across a wide range of IP industries and
galvanize a large enough coalition to pressure non-complying governments); see
also Alan O. Sykes, Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: The Case for Decoupling (and the
Uneasy Case for the Status Quo), in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 339, 347–50 (Chad P. Bown & Joost
Pauwelyn eds., 2010) (discussing the political calculations and consequences
governments weigh when formulating retaliatory action plans).
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while still dealing with a power (not law) driven trade system.142
Dispute settlement entails significant economic costs143 and the
risk of loss can have consequences not wholly in line with the
interests of a developed country complainant. In China—Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 144 the United States complained that China’s customs
measures for disposal of infringing goods did not comply with
Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, which required that
“competent authorities shall have the authority to order the
destruction or disposal of infringing goods . . . .”145 The Chinese
measures allowed seized goods to be donated to social welfare
organizations, sold to the rightsholder or auctioned as a last
resort.146 The United States objected to these practices, arguing that
“Article 59 requires full authority to be granted to dispose of or
destroy confiscated infringing goods . . . .” 147 The WTO Panel
rejected the United States’ argument, stating that the language
“shall have the authority” does not mean the authority must be
exercised in a particular way, and it certainly does not require it to
be exercised in the way the United States argued.148 Although the
United States won on the other issue before the Panel,149 the real
goals of weakening China’s regulatory and interpretive discretion
and eliminating channels by which infringing goods could remain
in circulation in China, and possibly beyond, were not achieved.

See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997).
143
See Timothy Stostad, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute
Settlement in the WTO, and Its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
811 (2006) (discussing the costs associated with dispute settlement procedures and
the barriers these costs place on poorer countries).
144 Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China—
Measures].
145 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 59.
146 China—Measures, supra note 144, ¶ 7.194.
147 Id. ¶ 7.199 (emphasis added).
148 Id. ¶ 7.238.
149
Id. ¶ 7.139 (finding that the Chinese Copyright Law Article 4(1) was
inconsistent with Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires that foreign copyright owners
receive the same level of protection as domestic owners of similar protected
works).
142
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The Reality of TRIPS Enforcement: Underwhelming and
Political

Despite initial excitement about the enforcement prospects of
the TRIPS Agreement, “the reality of sovereign interaction is that
diplomacy, power and domestic politics remain potent forces in
determining whether and how states will comply with their
international obligations.” 150 Binding dispute settlement under
TRIPS was designed to facilitate greater consistency, predictability
and enforcement of international IP norms. But, the process
established by the DSU encourages countries to settle disputes
through diplomatic channels to avoid unduly straining the WTO
system. This practice has in turn produced inconsistent, nontransparent and unpredictable outcomes even between countries
with similar alleged violations. 151 Moreover, as noted earlier,
private bartering over TRIPS violations has been an important
component of contemporary trade relations, especially among
developed countries in disputes with one another, 152 while
disputes between developed and developing countries have
seemed more likely to invoke the full gamut of the formal DSU
process.153 Developed countries have leveraged the DSU process to
exert pressure on developing countries and extract compliance in
ways that escape the scrutiny of the international community.154
Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51, at 634.
Id. at 617.
152 See, e.g., United States—Section 110(5), supra note 58 (outlining the United
States’ measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services and the United States failure to comply with DSB recommendations and
rulings).
153 See Stostad, supra note 143, at 830 (stating that the WTO has increased the
probability of disputes being filed against developing countries by 4.7 times).
154 Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51, at 617. Even mere threats
of invoking the DSU process have accomplished compliance in some developing
countries. See Rufus H. Yerxa & Demetrios J. Marantis, Assessing the New WTO
Dispute System: A U.S. Perspective, 32 INT’L L. 795, 808–09 (1998) (discussing the
effectiveness of threatening to file a case to induce WTO-consistent behavior from
another country). Developing countries are often at a bargaining disadvantage
because they rely on developed countries for financial aid and military assistance.
See Hansel T. Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation
in the DSU, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 347 (2004) (discussing the theoretical
benefits of the DSU’s objective goal of limiting dispute to legal issues and
insulating developing countries from political pressure).
150
151
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The fact that the DSU emphasizes opt-out possibilities and
encourages extra-legal resolution of disputes suggests that the
reality of diplomacy and politics as vital components of
cooperative relations between sovereign states was not lost to the
TRIPS negotiators.
From 2005 to 2011, 419 total WTO challenges were brought
under the DSU process, of which there were only 29 IP challenges.
Twenty of the IP challenges were against developed countries.155
As Professor Pauwelyn notes, the expectation of an enforcement
onslaught against developing countries has not materialized; only
9 of the 27 TRIPS disputes were North-South cases.156 Finally, of all
the IP disputes, only 8 matters were pursued to a WTO decision,
and all but one found a violation.157 These statistics confirm that
(1) TRIPS enforcement was neither the crowning triumph nor the
devastating disaster that some critics predicted; and (2) that
diplomacy, politics and the developed-developing country power
imbalance remain strong factors in TRIPS enforcement and
compliance, but that the balance of strategic interests could flow to
either party. There is no set stage or script that would advantage
one party over another, and legal innovation by courts and IP
agencies reflect the capacity to reset the normative global IP
balance, even if indirectly.
In sum, except in a few instances, dispute settlement under
TRIPS has not proven to be an outright victory for developed
countries as might have been anticipated in 1994. Instead, this
crown jewel of the demandeur countries has become a potentially
valuable tool to all countries, opening explicit room for discretion
and legal innovation even in areas that the TRIPS Agreement was
not intended to explicitly address or proscribe.

155 Lee, supra note 124, at 405; see also Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but
Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, in RESOLUTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (Jacques de Werra ed., 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708026 (comparing high expectations with the less
successful reality of settling IP disputes under TRIPS).
156
Pauwelyn, supra note 155, at 6 (“Secondly, the onslaught of IP
enforcement by developed countries against developing countries did not
materialize. Only 9 of the 27 TRIPS disputes (and 4 of the 9 TRIPS panels) were
North-South cases.”).
157 Id.
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The Triumph of Legislation in Developing Countries

If dispute settlement and compliance have been unremarkable
in the past twenty-one years, what change did the TRIPS
Agreement effect? Among most developing countries, TRIPSrequired IP legislation was adopted relatively promptly (some may
argue too quickly in many cases).158 This included pharmaceutical
patent legislation even in countries whose generic industries were
most threatened by the new global norms, namely Brazil and
India.159
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil provided very limited
patent protection for pharmaceutical products and processes.160 Its
prompt compliance with the new international rules allowed
pharmaceutical patent owners to start filing applications in Brazil
immediately. These applications were largely ignored until 2001
when new legislation mandated regular examination of chemical
and pharmaceutical product patents. 161 The same law, however,
declared that pharmaceutical and chemical process applications
would be rejected, because TRIPS only referred to product
patents. 162 A separate law provided that applications based on
foreign pharmaceutical product patents would be granted without

158 SISULE F. MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS,
INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN
TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 7–8
(2005) (stating that a majority of developing countries had established patent
legislation meeting TRIPS requirements prior to the deadline).
159 India’s initial efforts to implement the mailbox system generated the first
TRIPS dispute.
See Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997)
(recommending India bring its regime up to TRIPS standards). The United States
brought a claim against India alleging that it had failed to implement the required
legislation. Id. A WTO Appellate Body decision agreed. Id. For a compelling
analysis of this seminal decision, see Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement After US v. India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585 (1998).
160 Claudia Schulz & Mark Wu, The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property
Protection in Brazil, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 100, 100 (2004).
161 Id.
162 Lei No. 10.196 de 14 de Fevereiro de 2001 (Braz.); see also Schulz, supra
note 160, at 100–01 (describing the difficulty of the implementation in Brazil of the
TRIPS Agreement, which should have been incorporated immediately into
domestic law, but was not, due to misunderstandings at the Brazil Patent and
Trademark Office).
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a secondary novelty requirement.163 However, Brazil did maintain
a local working requirement, which authorizes compulsory
licensing if a patentee fails to work the patent locally.164 The U.S.
alleged this local working aspect of Brazilian patent law violated
the TRIPS Agreement and brought a complaint pursuant to the
DSU.165 Brazil argued that the provisions were necessary to help it
protect against the threat of HIV/AIDS consistent with the terms of
the TRIPS Agreement. 166 The United States later withdrew the
complaint,167 leaving the issue an open question of international
patent law168 and adding to the possible innovative responses to
deal with specific national interests.169 Indeed, the United States’
withdrawal could have been motivated by a political calculation
that the risks of a WTO finding that local working requirements
are TRIPS consistent would only encourage other countries to
adopt a similar domestic policy.170
Schulz, supra note 160, at 101.
Id.
165 Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
166
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001); see also GERVAIS, supra note 65, at
340 (“During the dispute, Brazil defended their ‘local working’ requirement as
necessary to ensure access to medicines, especially in light of the threat
HIV/AIDS posed to Brazil.”) (footnote omitted).
167 Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the
WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J.
INT’L L. 365, 366 n.4 (2002).
168
The Paris Convention allowed member states to impose compulsory
licenses for failure to work a patent after a delay. Paris Convention, supra note 1,
art. 5A.
169 It seems clear that local working requirements are not a violation of the
prohibition of discrimination under Article 27(1). See GERVAIS, supra note 65, at
340 (“It can be inferred from art. 27(1) that importation must be accepted among
the WTO members [sic] states as a legally effective working of a patent under
national law.”).
170 A U.S. government report states that the reason for withdrawal was a
commitment from Brazil to provide advance notice and consult with the U.S. if it
chooses to issue a compulsory license for failure to work a patent. See U.S. TRADE
REP., THE 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 33
(2005) (discussing intellectual property rights protection for patents and
trademarks). Arguably, this underscores the real interest of the United States:
constraining unilateral exercises of discretion even when they are within the
permissible boundaries of the TRIPS Agreement.
163
164

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/3

OKEDIJI FINALIZATION_36.1(1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/18/2015 5:36 PM

LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL IP

229

Like Brazil, the pre-TRIPS patent law adopted in India in 1970
contained an express prohibition on pharmaceutical product
patents, but allowed limited duration pharmaceutical process
patents. 171 As a result, India became a globally recognized
producer of low-priced generic pharmaceuticals, 172 supplying its
own vast national market and much of the developing world as
well. When India joined the WTO in 1995, it made three major
amendments to the Patents Act of 1970 to comply with its TRIPS
obligations. 173
The first allowed applicants to file for
pharmaceutical product patents for which they could be awarded
exclusive marketing rights for five years from the date of the
patent grant. 174
The second amendment provided for a
twenty-year patent term, reversal of the burden of proof for
process patent infringement from the patentee to the alleged
infringer,
and
modifications
to
compulsory
licensing
requirements. 175 In 2005, a third amendment offered patent
protection to pharmaceuticals and made India “substantially
compliant with TRIPS.”176
Although some TRIPS proponents expressed skepticism as to
whether developing countries would ignore or fail to enforce
TRIPS requirements,177 developing countries have not ignored the
legislation requirements, and indeed, many have exceeded them.178
Even in Brazil and India, where national development strategies
were purposefully designed around the absence of pharmaceutical
patent protection, legislation consistent with TRIPS obligations has
been adopted and foreign rights are being exercised in local
171 Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1576 (2009).
172 Id. at 1578.
173
V.K. Unni, Indian Patent Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Flexibility
Framework in the Context of Public Policy and Health, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 323, 330-31 (2012).
174 Id. at 330.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 331.
177 See, e.g., Charles S. Levy, Implementing TRIPS—A Test of Political Will, 31 L.
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 789, 789 (2000) (arguing that TRIPS compliance requires
adopting an entirely new body of law for developing countries, impacting
whether developing countries will conform and whether developed countries will
hold nonconforming developing countries accountable).
178 See infra notes 183–187 and accompanying text (discussing TRIPS-plus
provisions in developing countries).
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institutions. Despite being the object of criticism and threats by the
U.S., the reality is that since making its law TRIPS-compliant, India
has issued many pharmaceutical patents. The same is true for
Brazil. Legislative compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, to the
dismay of TRIPS critics, has been widespread even in the least
developed countries, which could have benefited from WTO
extensions.179
In short, global friction over TRIPS implementation has not
been focused on whether compliant legislative changes have been
adopted. Rather, the friction is focused on the ways in which
TRIPS flexibilities have been utilized, be they in the governing
statutes, in the courts or in administrative agencies, which, as the
following section suggests, are poised to be the leading
laboratories of legal innovation.
3. THE REALITY OF TRIPS: INSTITUTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION
Part 3 presents three case studies of legal innovation in three
countries: India, Brazil and Malta. Together, these nations
highlight how legal innovation can be achieved through judicial
processes, institutional action or industrial policy. Ultimately, each
of these case studies exemplifies the role of legal innovation in
shaping national development strategies and domestic policy
prerogatives. Lastly, Part 3 presents a short explanation of the
manner in which developed countries have resisted innovative
efforts in the developing world and the justifications for that
hostility.
3.1.

Legal Innovation in the Developing Countries

Following the TRIPS Agreement, commentators voiced
concerns that stronger IP minimum standards could constrain
development, reduce employment and economic growth, threaten
public health interests and undermine access to essential
179 See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 8 (“Over a third of the WTO’s 106 developing
country members included a broad range of TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws.
Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group were LDCs—the same
countries that the economic literature anticipates would adopt the lowest levels of
IP protection.”).
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technologies and knowledge.180 Critics warned that heightened IP
standards would lead to devastating price increases in many
critical imported technologies, such as seeds, medicines and
educational materials.181 Furthermore, limiting the ability of these
countries to reverse-engineer, adapt and build upon existing
technologies from developed countries could impede national
industrial development. 182 Beyond these concerns, developing
countries faced significant financial and administrative challenges
in implementing and enforcing the new standards. Although
TRIPS provides several so-called “flexibilities” that could have
ameliorated some of these concerns, many developing countries
did not take advantage of them—at least not explicitly. Instead,
many countries established laws exceeding the minimum
requirements of TRIPS, colloquially known as “TRIPS-plus”
provisions.183 Counterintuitively, nations with the least flexibility
and the highest levels of TRIPS-plus protection are often the leastdeveloped countries.184
A large body of scholarship suggests that countries deviated
from their own local interests due to intense political, economic
180 See, e.g., id. at 9–10 (explaining that in advocating for weaker IP minimum
standards, “developing countries sought to employ the same strategies of copying
and reverse engineering that had served developed countries at similar stages of
development” and that “[f]or the poorest and smallest countries . . . the potential
economic returns of higher IP protection were a . . . distant prospect”); Molly
Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 435–45 (2012) (arguing that
TRIPS limits countries’ ability to “foster innovation and protect human health and
welfare”) (citation omitted); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82
IND. L.J. 827, 828 (2007) (contending that TRIPS requires countries “to adopt onesize-fits-all legal standards that ignore their local needs, national interests,
technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health conditions.”).
181
DEERE, supra note 8, at 9; THE FUTURE CONTROL OF FOOD: A GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND RULES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIODIVERSITY
AND FOOD SECURITY (Geoff Tansey & Tasmin Rajotte eds., 2008); Ellen F.M. ’t
Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way
from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 41 (2002); Mohammad Towhidul Islam,
Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in Bangladesh: Prospects and Concerns, 6
MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 1, 6 (2009).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 13 (“Over a third of the WTO’s 106 developing country members
included a broad range of TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws.”).
184 Id. (“Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group were LDCs—the
same countries that the economic literature anticipates would adopt the lowest
levels of IP protection.”); see also id. at 100-02 (presenting in tables and graphs a
negative trend between the strength of IP protection and countries’ GDP per
capita as of 2003). Many of these countries were beneficiaries of the largesse of
the TRIPS technical assistance described in Part 1.
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and trade-related pressures from developed countries. 185 For
example, bilateral trade and investment agreements were offered
to developing countries in exchange for agreements to forego
flexibilities or implement TRIPS-plus standards.186 In other cases,
where bilateral negotiations failed, developed countries resorted to
unilateral coercion through threats of trade sanctions, diplomatic
engagement and industry pressure from multinational
corporations.187
Despite a global environment fraught with tension and deep
turmoil over the use of TRIPS flexibilities, it is unlikely that
development gains can rapidly accrue based merely on adoption of
normative rules in national laws, necessary though they may be.
Some developing countries appear to have recognized this and
embraced the need for progressive responses to TRIPS
obligations. 188 Certain aspects of the political bureaucracy in a
number of developing countries, for example, have cleverly
imposed limits on national IP agencies that had proven more easily
captured by the technical assistance bounty offered through a
variety of transnational actors. 189 Further, local agents in
developing countries, sometimes motivated by domestic turf
battles rather than altruistic concerns over misguided IP policies,
formed collaborative partnerships with the access to knowledge
movement in order to exert their own pressures in the national
policy sphere. 190 The capacity to recognize and curtail forumshopping by TRIPS entrepreneurs is a development that has been
aided in part by the access to knowledge network191 and the highly
185 See, e.g., id. at 104, 114–16, 150–51 (chronicling a multitude of pressures
that caused developing countries to adopt strong IP standards against their
economic interests).
186 Id. at 150–155; Land, supra note 180, at 442, n.45.
187 DEERE, supra note 8, at 159–164; see also Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note
107, at 58, n.30 (explaining how developing countries have used TRIPS-plus
requirements over other types of agreements).
188 See infra Part 4.2–3.
189
See Deere, supra note 8 (describing ways in which IP agencies in
developing countries are influenced by foreign organizations and rightsholders).
See also Carolyn Deere, The Politics of Reform in Developing Countries, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS
IN A CHANGING WORLD 21, 30–32 (Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Pedro Roffe eds.,
2009); Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil’s Copyright Law Reform: Tropicália 3.0? 54–59
(2014) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Duke University School of Law) (on file with
author) (describing the influential role of rightsholders and copyright agencies in
Brazil’s copyright reform process).
190 Kapczynski, supra note 10, at 825–39; Deere, supra note 8, at 30–32.
191 See, e.g., Letter to Francis Gurry, Dir. Gen., World Intell. Prop. Org. (Feb.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/3

OKEDIJI FINALIZATION_36.1(1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/18/2015 5:36 PM

LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL IP

233

visible influence of IP interest group pressure on domestic policies
in the developed countries. Institutions and new processes are
therefore emerging in developing countries to challenge the
dominant narrative of the substantive provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement.
Three case studies suggest the rise of legal innovation to
address the welfare challenges related to TRIPS implementation
and compliance. These cases did not arise from the shadows of
flexibilities, but rather from the sunlight of hard doctrine.
3.1.1.

India – An Example of Judicial Innovation

After India’s independence from Britain in 1947, it was left with
a patent system that favored foreigners and a health care system
dependent on imported medications sold at a premium. 192 In
response, India’s leaders demanded changes to the patent system.
A committee was appointed in 1948 to review patent laws to
ensure conformity with identified national interests.193 Based on
recommendations from the committee report, the 1911 Patents Act
was amended in relation to the working of inventions and
compulsory licensing. 194 A second report, issued in 1959,
recommended radical modifications of existing patent laws,
emphasizing the need to spur domestic innovation and to avoid
international pressure to join international conventions requiring
national treatment.195
7,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/files/AfricaIPSummit2012_0
207.pdf (100 signatories, mostly NGOs, expressing "significant disappointment"
regarding the content and organization of U.S.-backed Africa Intellectual Property
Forum: Intellectual Property, Regional Integration and Economic Growth in
Africa); William New, US, WIPO Training Programme on IP Rights in Africa Comes
Under Fire, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.ipwatch.org/2012/02/12/us-wipo-training-programme-on-ip-rights-in-africacomes-under-fire/ (detailing international reaction to the proposed African IP
summit).
192 Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of
India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L.
REV. 491, 509–10 (2007).
193 Id. at 510–11.
194
Id. at 511; see also History of Indian Patent System, INTELL PROP. INDIA,
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/PatentHistory.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014)
(outlining the history of the Indian patent system from 1856–2005).
195 Mueller, supra note 192, at 511–12; History of Indian Patent System, supra
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In 1970, India enacted a national patent law prohibiting patents
on pharmaceutical products. 196 By 1979, the number of patent
applications by foreign filers had decreased to less than a quarter
of the number filed in 1968.197 Conversely, the new patent law led
to a significant increase in Indian generic drug manufacturing and
a dramatic decline in the price of medicines sold in India.198 India
soon became known as a “pirate” or “copycat” nation because
generic drug companies could (and did) legally copy
pharmaceutical products patented outside of India.199 The ability
to copy pre-existing pharmaceuticals, with only minimal R&D
investments and no patent royalties to pay, allowed these
companies to produce drugs far cheaper than those of any foreign
competitor.200
In this patent-free environment, the Indian generics industry
soared and drug prices plummeted, forcing many multinational
drug companies to leave India.201 The number of pharmaceutical
facilities skyrocketed, with over twenty thousand Indian
companies supplying ninety-five percent of the pharmaceutical
market in that country. This resulted in huge boosts to India’s
note 194.
196 Mueller, supra note 192, at 512–13.
197 Id. at 513–14; Kapczynski, supra note 171, at 1577–78.
198 Mueller, supra note 192, at 514.
199
See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s
Copycats
Irk
Industry,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/01/science/01PIRA.html (describing the
emergence of an industry of pharmaceutical piracy due to India’s relaxation of
patent laws); see also Mueller, supra note 192, at 514 (“The eventual economic effect
of the India Patents Act, 1970, was a dramatic increase in domestic generic drug
manufacturing and a sharp decline in the price of medicines sold in India . . . .
The ‘pirate’ label was unduly pejorative, however, and contradicted the basic
principle of territoriality in patent law. No violations of any foreign patent laws
occurred so long as the copied drugs were made and sold only in India . . . .”).
200
David K. Tomar, A Look into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute
Between the United States and India, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 579, 584 (1999) (noting that
India could produce a drug for as little as $90 million, compared to a price tag of
at least $300 million in Western countries in the late 1990s); see also B.K. KEAYLA,
Conquest by Patents, in TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PATENT LAWS: IMPACT ON
PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH FOR ALL 9 (1998) (describing how, in 1998, the
brand-name antacid Zantac was being sold in the U.S. for more than one hundred
times the price of the Indian generic version).
201 B.K. KEAYLA, Conquest by Patents, in TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PATENT LAWS:
IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH FOR ALL 9 (1998).
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economy and employment rates, with pharmaceutical companies
directly employing five million, and another twenty-four million
indirectly.202
Over time, India’s pharmaceutical industry not only expanded
production, but also grew more technically sophisticated.203 The
industry developed expertise in reverse engineering drugs and
rapidly diversified.204 However, because the manufacturing boom
resulted largely from copying existing drugs, it did not result in
increased innovation in new drugs.205 Today, R&D investment by
Indian firms appears to be on the rise, although relative to Western
companies, this investment is still minimal. 206 Despite positive
signs in the Indian pharmaceutical industry,207 commentators have
expressed concern that the critical dominance of local firms could
be lost in a recent wave of mergers and acquisitions purposefully
designed to eliminate Indian generic competition in global
markets.208
The active role of the Indian judiciary in IP cases makes this
outcome unlikely. A highly controversial decision by the Indian
KPMG, THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: COLLABORATION FOR
GROWTH, INDUSTRIAL MARKETS (2006) [hereinafter KPMG, INDIA], available at
http://www.in.kpmg.com/pdf/indian%20pharma%20 outlook.pdf.
203 Kapczynski, supra note 171, at 1578.
204 Id.
205 Mueller, supra note 188, at 515.
206 Id. at 516, n.132 (remarking on the minimal R&D investment levels for
Indian drug companies in the 1990s – around one to two percent of total revenue –
compared to an average of fifteen percent among Western companies); id. at 537–
38 (identifying that while small Indian pharmaceutical firms still rely solely on
reverse-engineering drugs, top Indian generic companies have increased their
R&D investments, and Ranbaxy, one of India’s three largest pharmaceutical
companies, spends around seven to nine percent of its total revenue on R&D).
207 Id. at 537–41 (noting that (1) major Indian drug companies are increasing
investments in R&D; (2) many patents worth billions of dollars will expire in the
coming years; and (3) under India’s new patent laws, drug manufacturers can
continue to copy pharmaceuticals available in the Indian market prior to 1995).
208 See William Greene, The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical Industry and
Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug Market 8-9 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n., Office
of Economics, Working Paper No. 2007-05-A, 2007) (observing that since the
passing of the 2005 patent law, large Indian pharmaceutical companies have
acquired foreign generics producers in first-world countries to better access their
domestic markets, but small Indian pharmaceutical companies that were formerly
engaged solely in copying are being acquired by domestic and foreign companies
with broader market strategies).
202
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Supreme Court, Novartis AG v. Union of India,209 illustrates the kind
of creative legal innovation designed to establish a uniquely
national-focused
approach
to
TRIPS
compliance
and
implementation.
At issue in the case was a 1998 Novartis patent application for
the anti-leukemia drug Gleevec, which claimed the solid (or “beta
crystalline”) form of a compound (imatinib mesylate) previously
patented in 1996. 210 After the Indian Patent Office rejected the
application, 211 Novartis appealed to the Indian Patent Appeals
Board (IPAB).212 The IPAB affirmed rejection of the Gleevec patent
under the now infamous Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act,
which provides that a “new form of known substance” is not an
invention unless it results in significant enhancement of efficacy.213
On final appeal, the Indian Supreme Court affirmed the IPAB
rejection of Novartis’s Gleevec application, clarifying that
“efficacy” under Section 3(d) refers to “therapeutic efficacy,”
weighed by strict and narrow standards.214 The Court held that a
“mere change of form with properties inherent to that form” does
not qualify as “’enhancement of efficacy’ of a known substance.”215
Put differently, because Gleevec was merely the inherent solid
form of the earlier known substance, it did not qualify as an
enhancement of efficacy.216
The United States and other countries have expressed concern

See generally Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311
(India), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/out today/patent.pdf.
210 Pyrimidine Derivatives and Processes for the Preparation Thereof, U.S.
Patent No. 5,521,184 (filed Apr. 28, 1994 as a continuation–in-part of an
abandoned application filed on Apr. 2, 1993) (issued May 28, 1996).
211 See Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Ltd., Controller of Patents and Designs,
Indian Patent Office, Application No. 1602/MAS/1998 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1352538 (concluding in a judicial opinion to not
proceed with the application for Patent No. 1602/MAS/1998).
212 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., IPAB Order No. 100/2009 (June 26,
2009)
[hereinafter
Novartis
IPAB],
available
at
http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/Orders/100-2009.htm.
213 The Patent Act, No. 39 of 1970, as amended by Patents Act, No. 15 of
2005, § 3(d) (India); Novartis IPAB, supra note 209.
214
Novartis,
A.I.R.
2013
S.C.
1311,
available
at
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf.
215 Id.
216 Id.
209
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over this application of India’s TRIPS-compliant Patent Act.217 The
international responses and accompanying political pressure on
India over the decision have continued to play out on the
international stage. 218 In February 2014, the U.S. International
Trade Commission held hearings on the impact of India’s trade
policies on U.S. economic interests, with a particular emphasis on
the recent Gleevec decision.219 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
called on the U.S. government to place India on its controversial
priority watch list, 220 which happened on October 14, 2014. 221
217 See Lisa Kilday, Global IP Reaction to India’s Rejection of the Novartis Drug
Patent,
IPWATCHDOG
(May
28,
2013,
7:30
AM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/28/global-ip-reaction-to-indias-rejectionof-the-novartis-drug-patent/id=40778 (describing India’s Patent Act, the Indian
Supreme Court’s rejection of the patent for Novartis’ drug Gleevac, and the
debate as to whether the Patent Act is still TRIPS compliant).
218 Id.
219 Trade, Investment, and Industrial Policies in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy,
Inv. No. 332-543, USITC Pub. 78 FR 54677 (Feb. 6, 2014) (Final), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/332/332_
543_notice02062014sgl.pdf; see also US Trade Panel Begins Critical Hearings on Indian
Policy,
BUSINESS STANDARD
(Feb.
13,
2014),
http://www.businessstandard.com/article/economy-policy/us-trade-panel-begins-critical-hearingson-indian-policy-114021300075_1.html (describing the investigation by the U.S.
International Trade Commission into India’s trade, investment, and industrial
policies, focusing on India’s intellectual property rights regime as of 2003); US
Trade Panel Launches Probe Against India’s Trade Policies, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Feb.
12, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-0212/news/47270048_1_indian-ipr-linda-dempsey-global-intellectual-propertycenter (noting that the USITC began investigations into India’s trade and
investment policies on the United States).
220 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM., 2014 SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 54 (2014), available at
http://www.worldipreview.com/media/project_wipr/ document/special-3012014-gipc.pdf (“The Chamber strongly recommends that India be designated a
Priority Foreign Country.”). In a WTO dispute, the European Communities
claimed that Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 are inconsistent with
several WTO provisions. See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter United States—Section
301-310]. The panel found that Sections 301–310 were not inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under the WTO. Id. at 350. The panel noted that its conclusions are
based on U.S. administration undertakings in which the United States pledged to
base any section 301 determinations on “panel or Appellate Body findings
adopted by the DSB.” Id. at 331. The Panel observed that should the U.S.
assurances be repudiated or removed, the “conclusions would no longer be
warranted.” Id. at 351.
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Whether such a move by the United States is TRIPS-compliant is
questionable.222 The fact that the United States is pursuing soft
unilateral action, and not a WTO process, suggests it is not.
Arguably, the Gleevec decision is simply a straightforward
221 See Biswajit Dhar & TC James, Inside Views: USTR’s Investigations on IP
Rights Against India: Is There a Tenable Case?, IP WATCH (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/10/20/ustrs-investigations-on-ip-rights-againstindia-is-there-a-tenable-case/ (positing that India’s placement on the Priority
Watch List by the USTR stemmed from concerns about “exclusions from
patentability provided in Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, the use of compulsory
licences and India’s refusal to introduce market exclusivity while protecting data
on clinical trials before marketing approval is given to a pharmaceutical product,
[and] inadequacy of measures to prevent online piracy of films.”).
222
Article 23(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that
Members seeking the redress of violations “shall”:

[N]ot make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred,
that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except
through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such
determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or
Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award
rendered under this Understanding . . . .
Id. at 22–23 (emphasis added). The panel decision in United States—Section 301310 also emphasized the potential impact of unilateral actions on the WTO
system:
Members faced with a threat of unilateral action, especially when it
emanates from an economically powerful Member, may in effect be
forced to give in to the demands imposed by the Member exerting the
threat . . . . To put it differently, merely carrying a big stick is, in many
cases, as effective a means to having one’s way as actually using the
stick. The threat alone of conduct prohibited by the WTO would enable
the Member concerned to exert undue leverage on other Members. It
would disrupt the very stability and equilibrium which multilateral
dispute resolution was meant to foster and consequently establish,
namely equal protection of both large and small, powerful and less
powerful Members through the consistent application of a set of rules
and procedures.
United States—Section 301-310, supra note 220, at 325; see also Sean Flynn, US Uses
Special 301 To Bully Ukraine, Likely Violating WTO, TECHDIRT (May 17, 2013, 12:01
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130513/
16505323067/us-usesspecial-301-to-bully-ukraine-likely-violating-wto.shtml (describing the United
States’ listing the Ukraine as a “Priority Foreign Country” under Section 301 of the
Trade Act to trigger investigations into Ukrainian trade activity and whether the
proposed unilateral adjudication by the U.S. constitutes a threat intended to
control Ukrainian behavior, which would be prohibited within the WTO
framework in light of the Section 301-310 decision).
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application of India’s domestic patent law pursuant to TRIPS
Article 27. After all, the TRIPS Agreement does not mandate
consistency in how its minimum standards are construed, but only
that they must be present in national laws. There is no real
controversy that India’s law and the Court’s application are TRIPScompliant. Accordingly, the extent to which developed countries
and firms have expressed dissatisfaction with the Indian Court’s
ruling, and why the Gleevec decision occasioned such intense
global debate, is particularly puzzling.223 One explanation is that
in light of India’s competitive position in the generics market, the
decision may appear simply to mask the kind of trade
protectionism that the TRIPS Agreement was supposed to have
eliminated. Thus while the law and decision are unassailable on
grounds of textual conformity, firms from developed countries
likely find the spirit of the Gleevec decision inconsistent with their
own perception of the “purpose and objective” of the TRIPS
Agreement.
A deeper and potentially more troubling explanation may coexist with the first. Back in 1994, developing countries negotiated
the TRIPS Agreement in a context of extremely limited technical
capacity. Not only did IP issues not rank highly on the list of
demands by developing and least-developed countries for the
Uruguay Round, but IP issues did not attract the same level of
social agitation or intuitive understanding domestically as, for
example, the prospect of a bad deal in agriculture. The lack of
technical capacity in IP, coupled with the absence of a wellmobilized domestic coalition, made compromises over TRIPS rules
ultimately easier for developing countries to accept in the
framework of a package deal in which enhanced market access for
agricultural goods was exchanged for increased IP protection.224
That some developing countries might have overcome this
capacity gap twenty-one years after the TRIPS Agreement, and
what to expect from those countries once that occurred, is not
something developed countries likely contemplated.
In reality, the framework in which contemporary international
223
See USTR, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 38 (2013), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%
20Report.pdf (“The United States is concerned that the recent decision by India’s
Supreme Court with respect to India’s prohibition on patents for certain chemical
forms absent a showing of ‘enhanced efficacy’ may have the effect of limiting the
patentability of potentially beneficial innovations.”).
224
See generally Gonzalez, supra note 129 (analyzing how agreements on
agricultural trade were held hostage to agreements concerning other trade-related
issues, including intellectual property rights).
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relations unfolds remains deeply marked with vestiges of colonial
rationalization that ascribe the basest motives to non-Western
values, priorities, institutions and knowledge forms, or, at best,
subordinates them to those that emerged from the West.225 The
sociopolitical response to the Gleevec decision–the shock and awe
it attracted–unfortunately reveals continuing skepticism (or
surprise) that courts outside of advanced economies can credibly
analyze IP doctrines and make intelligent assessments about what
best serves the social values and welfare of their societies. At the
most elemental level, the overheated reaction to Gleevec and the
ensuing threats of unilateral reprisal also fundamentally question
the right of national judicial institutions to do so.
3.1.2.

Brazil – An Example of Institutional Innovation

Brazil’s Anuência Prévia (Prior Consent) law, established in
1999, created a unique and controversial patent examination
process to comply with the TRIPS requirement of pharmaceutical
patentability. 226
This system divides the examination of
pharmaceutical patent applications between two agencies: the
National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) and the National
Sanitary Supervision Agency (ANVISA).227 INPI is responsible for
examining the legal sufficiency of patent applications, analogous to
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.228 ANVISA, on the other
225
See generally Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism,
Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445 (1993); Antony
Anghie, The Grotius Lecture: ASIL 2010 International Law in a Time of Change: Should
International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315 (2011).
226 The provisional version of the Prior Consent law, Industrial Property Law
No. 9,279 of May 14, 1996 (Braz.), amended by Provisional Measure No. 2,006 of
Dec. 14, 1999 (Braz.), was eventually codified in Industrial Property Law No.
10,196 of Feb. 14, 2001, art. 229 (Braz.) [hereinafter Law No. 10,196], which limited
the provision to pharmaceutical patents. See Edson Beas Rodrigues Junior &
Bryan Murphy, Brazil’s Prior Consent Law, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 426-27
(2006) (noting that Law No. 10,196’s applicability was “confined to . . .
pharmaceutical-related patents”).
227 Law No. 10,196, supra note 226; see also, e.g., Rodrigues & Murphy, supra
note 226, at 427 (describing how the shift to Prior Consent “partly vest[ed]”
regulatory confidence in ANVISA where previously it had been solely vested in
INPA).
228
See Meet the INPI, INPI, http://www.inpi.gov.br/portal/artigo/
conheca_o_inpi (last updated Dec. 28, 2012) (describing the role and operations of
INPI as processing, disseminating, and managing the Brazilian system of granting
and securing intellectual property rights).
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hand, is a separate agency devoted to protecting and promoting
“public health” in Brazil,229 analogous to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration.230 Under the Prior Consent law, INPI no longer
has the authority to grant patents on its own; rather, after
determining that an application is patentable, it must forward the
application to ANVISA for its consent, purportedly based on
public health considerations.231
However, according to a 2008 Resolution issued by ANVISA,
ANVISA believes that it also has the authority to engage in a
secondary analysis of patentability. It claims, “[a]fter having
received the patent applications submitted by INPI, ANVISA will
carry out its analysis with respect to the prior consent thereto,
assessing whether said applications meet the patentability
requirements.”232 In other words, under the Brazilian two-stage
examination process, two different agencies examine patentability
using different criteria, with the second (ANVISA) likely being of
lesser technical competence. 233 In effect, this system allows
ANVISA to veto any pharmaceutical patent, despite an INPI
229
See
The
Agency,
ANVISA,
http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/portal/anvisa-ingles/anvisaingles/Agencia
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (presenting the myriad ways ANVISA protects and
promotes public health).
230
See
What
We
Do,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2014) (“[The] FDA is responsible for protecting the public health . . . by helping to
speed innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable
. . . [and by] regulating the manufacturing, marketing and distribution of tobacco
products . . . .”).
231 Law No. 10,196, supra note 226, art. 229-C (“The granting of patents on
pharmaceutical products or processes shall depend on the prior consent of the
National Sanitary Supervision Agency (ANVISA).”); see also, e.g., Lisa L. Mueller,
Recent Brazilian Jurisprudence Concerning the Scope of ANVISA’s Prior Consent, BRIC
WALL (Oct. 14, 2013), http://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/tag/prior-consent
(contextualizing Law No. 10,196 within ANVISA’s government mandate to
protect the public health by preventing the production of potentially harmful
products and services).
232 Resolution (RDC) No. 45 of June 23, 2008 (Braz.).
233
See, e.g., Eduardo Da Gama Camara, Jr., Brazil: Prosecution of
Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Tensions Between the Brazilian Patent Office and
ANVISA,
MONDAQ
(last
updated
July
22,
2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=253068
(arguing
that
the
introduction of ANVISA patent review was a means for the Brazilian government
to take control of the “sensitive field of pharmaceuticals” and that the argument
that ANVISA is more technically qualified than INPI to evaluate the safety of
pharmaceutical patents is clearly hollow: first, only 4% of applications submitted
to ANVISA for approval are denied and second, ANVISA has contracted INPI
examiners to carry out its patent analysis).
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determination of patentability, resulting in a doubly unpredictable
patent application outcome.234
Following the 2008 ANVISA Resolution, INPI brought an
administrative proceeding that contested ANVISA’s ability to carry
out this dual patentability analysis. During the proceeding, the
Attorney General’s Office issued an opinion declaring that
ANVISA should be limited to examining issues closely related to
its institutional purpose of promoting public health.235
In 2013, ANVISA issued a new Resolution, amending the
previous 2008 ANVISA Resolution.236 The new 2013 Resolution
states that ANVISA will review the patent applications “in light of
the public health.”237 The application will be considered contrary
to public health if it (1) “presents a health risk” or (2) the
application is “of interest to drug policy or pharmaceutical
services” and “do[es] not meet the patentability requirements.”238
Although the 2013 Resolution more explicitly invokes ANVISA’s
institutional purpose, it makes no progress in resolving the dual
legal analysis because it lists patentability as an element of public
health.239
ANVISA’s implementation of the Prior Consent law for
pharmaceutical patent examination could be viewed as a violation
of TRIPS Article 27.1, which prohibits discrimination against
particular fields of patentable technologies. 240 ANVISA only
reviews pharmaceutical applications, and it denies approval to
approximately 5% of those applications (usually all deemed
patentable by INPI). This suggests that ANIVSA is doing either (or
both) of the following: (1) applying a stricter standard of
patentability than INPI, which may be discriminatory because this
stricter standard thereby applies only to pharmaceuticals; or (2)
applying extraneous considerations related to public health, which
234 See Rodrigues & Murphy, supra note 226, at 427 (explaining that ANVISA
performs the second round of review, taking into consideration the impacts of a
patent on social interests relating to public health, and that in the case of a
disagreement between ANVISA and INPI over the patentability of an invention,
the patent will not be approved).
235 PGF/AGU se posiciona quanto às competências do INPI e ANVISA no
processo de Anuência prévia das patentes de produtos/processos farmacêuticos,
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 210/PGF/AE/2009 (Braz.).
236 Resolution (RDC) No. 21 of Apr. 10, 2013 (Braz.); Resolution No. 45, supra
note 232.
237 Resolution No. 21, supra note 237.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.1.
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may also be discriminatory because such considerations are being
applied only to pharmaceuticals.241
In addition to scholarly criticisms, the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) has also stated that the Brazilian Prior
Consent system “raises concerns with respect to Article 27 of the
TRIPS Agreement.”242 More recently, in a 2013 report, the USTR
expressed stronger criticisms of this system and urged Brazil to
adopt a more transparent and predictable examination process.243
Nothing in Brazil’s controversial patent reform process thus far
suggests this will happen, and nothing in the TRIPS Agreement
requires such change.
In a separate legal dispute, INPI is also attempting to “correct”
the terms of certain agrochemical and pharmaceutical patents.
When Brazil joined the WTO, like other developing countries, it
was allowed a transitional period to introduce pharmaceutical and
agrochemical patents. TRIPS Article 70.8 provided that developing
countries utilizing this transitional period must allow inventors to
file such patents as of January 1, 1995, but that a decision to grant
could be delayed until January 1, 2005.244 Pursuant to TRIPS, the
term of any such “mailbox patent” is twenty years from the filing
241 See ANVISA, Propriedade Intelectual de Produtos e Processos Farmacêuticos:
Situaçao
dos
Processos
(Jan.
11,
2006),
available
at
http://www.anvisa.gov.br/medicamentos/intelectual/situacao_processos.pdf
(displaying the progress of various patents through ANVISA review); Rodrigues
& Murphy, supra note 226, at 448–54 (arguing that the Prior Consent Law is
discriminatory and violates TRIPS).
242 See USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
33-34
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/20
05_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file383_7446.pdf (considering that Law No. 10,196
“includes some problematic provisions, including a requirement that Health
Ministry approval be obtained prior to the issuance of a pharmaceutical patent”);
see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (highlighting the irony that a call for greater predictability of
the examination process is coming from the U.S., where the patent administrative
system has been under serious criticism about its shortcomings in stewarding the
nation’s innovation capacity).
243 See USTR, SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 223, at 45.
244 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2 (“[T]he United States is concerned about
recent regulations that provide Brazil’s sanitary regulatory agency, ANVISA, with
the authority to review pharmaceutical patent applications for meeting
patentability requirements. These regulations appear to contravene an earlier
opinion by the Federal Attorney General that clarified that ANVISA did not have
this authority. The United States urges Brazil to continue to work with
stakeholders to ensure that its patent examination process is transparent and
predictable.”).
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date.245 Brazil adopted this mailbox consideration for applications
“filed between January 1, 1995 and May 14, 1997”246 and did not
take advantage of the transition period. The mailbox applications
were to be reviewed until December 31, 2004, and the term of these
patents was set to twenty years from the date of filing, but not less
than ten years from the grant.247
INPI has been examining and issuing mailbox patents well past
the deadline of December 31, 2004, and these patents had been
receiving terms of ten years from grant. Because of the delayed
processing time, however, the effective patent terms have, in many
cases, been much longer than twenty years from filing, the
minimum established by TRIPS. On September 12, 2013, INPI filed
thirty-three lawsuits seeking a corrected term of the mailbox
patents, nullification of the patents and a request to suspend rights
while the lawsuit is pending.248 Many U.S. and EU companies are
likely to settle.249
INPI’s strategy reflects a novel use of its administrative power
to roll back rights to the minimum required under TRIPS, despite
the fact that Brazil had voluntarily established a system in which
the extended term was clearly of its own making. Since the TRIPS
Agreement sets a floor and not a ceiling for patent terms (and other
provisions), Brazil arguably has the right to “claw back” the longer
patent terms. Brazil’s ability to reverse previously issued patent
terms that are greater than the TRIPS Agreement requires is a
remarkable and unusual display of the degree of the innovation
possible in adjusting national rules to advance domestic interests.
INPI’s lawsuits also reveal, again, the sheer breadth of normative
power residing in the highly technical and bureaucratic setup of
national patent offices.250
It is worthwhile to consider why Brazil exhibits such a high
level of legal innovation. Since the 1970s, Brazil has played an
active role in seeking to limit the effect of the international patent
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 33.
Law No. 10,196, supra note 226, art. 229.
247 Id. art. 229-B; Industrial Property Law No. 9,279, supra note 226, art. 40.
248 See Lisa L. Mueller, Gustavo de Freitas Morais & Justin Duarte Piné, The
Problem of Mailbox Patents and Patent Term in Brazil, BRIC WALL (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/2013/10/01/the-problem-of-mailboxpatents-and-patent-term-in-brazil (elaborating on the series of events leading up
to INPI’s filing in the Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro).
249 Confidential interview with a U.S. organization involved in the litigation
by INPI.
250 PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES
AND THEIR CLIENTS (2010).
245
246
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system on its development policy.251 As early as 1967, Brazil made
a conscious decision that patent law would be its IP priority as part
of a national industrial policy plan that included ensuring access to
technology for Brazilian firms. 252 Accordingly, the country was
committed to a global system in which a panoply of patent options
to facilitate such access would remain available.253 The evidence
from Brazil since then has been consistent. It has utilized every
forum possible to advance development-related IP goals, while at
the same time advancing protection for patents as the country
experiences technological growth. Brazil’s domestic calibration of
its laws occurs not only through the Patent Act, but also by
utilizing a series of institutional procedures that ensure the welfare
of Brazil is at the forefront of its patent system.254
By initiating and staunchly defending trade disputes with the
developed countries, Brazil has established a norm of constructive
engagement with the TRIPS framework and proven that it is
comfortable with asserting claims that preserve its discretion over
the appropriate balance between access and protection of
knowledge assets. Brazil is willing to defend its domestic
implementation prerogative as a core right of the TRIPS
Agreement, making it difficult for advanced economies to make
idle threats. 255 The patent reform process unfolding nationally
demonstrates the evolving role of patent law in Brazilian society;256
it reflects the complex deliberation over the appropriate contours
of patent policy for a country with a patent office that functions
like those in the developed countries, but a society that reflects the
welfare challenges of the developing countries.
251 See Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc A/C.2/L.565 (Nov. 8, 1961) [hereinafter
Brazilian Draft Resolution] (“It is in the best interest of all countries that the
international patent system be applied in such a way as to reconcile the legitimate
claims of patent holders with the needs and requirements of the economic
development of under-developed countries.”).
252
Confidential Memo from the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations,
Mission in Geneva, Apr. 18, 1967 (declassified Sept. 12, 2004).
253 See Brazilian Draft Resolution, supra note 251 (“Access to experience in
the field of applied science and technology is essential to accelerate the economic
development of under-developed countries.”).
254 Law No. 10,196, supra note 226. In addition to the self-actuated initiatives
of ANVISA described above, Brazil also requires that technology-transfer
agreements register with the patent office. Moreover, it has strong disclosure
requirements for patents based on genetic resources.
255 See, e.g., supra Part 1.3.1. (discussing U.S. WTO complaint about Brazil’s
local working law and withdrawal of same).
256
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. & DEBATES, BRAZIL’S
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS (2013).
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Malta – A Modern Example of IP as Industrial Policy

Malta became obligated to adopt and implement the TRIPS
Agreement in 1995 when it became a member of the WTO. 257
Although the Maltese legal framework provides adequate
protection for patent holders, 258 the relatively small size of the
Maltese market historically discouraged many drug manufacturers
from pursuing separate patent protection there. 259 Generic
manufacturers are thus able to exploit opportunities to produce
these unprotected drugs and ship them throughout the EU due to
the principle of regional exhaustion that follows from the primacy
of free movement of goods in the European Community.260
Malta only recently became a strategically advantageous
location for generic pharmaceutical manufacturing, based on its
implementation of a Bolar exception as established in the U.S. case
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. 261 Bolar
exceptions generally provide infringement exemption for research
and tests performed in conjunction with applications for regulatory
approval. Although Bolar exceptions exist in numerous countries,
jurisdictions apply them unevenly.262
257
Malta
and
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/malta_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014).
258 Patents & Designs Act, ch. 417 (2002) (Malta).
259 KPMG, MALTA: THE HUB FOR WORLD-CLASS PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 1
(2011)
[hereinafter
KPMG,
MALTA],
available
at
http://www.kpmg.com/MT/en/IssuesAndInsights/Doing%20Business%20in%
20Malta/Documents/Pharmaceutical%20companies.pdf (explaining that Malta
has become an ideal location for pharmaceutical companies to do business due to
Malta’s “unique legal framework, solid incentives[,] and highly skilled labour
market”).
260
International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.ht
m.
261 Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that the traditional experimental use exception for patent infringement
does not apply to pre-market testing done by generic manufactures and those that
have been submitted to a regulatory agency).
262
For a comparison of different Bolar exceptions, see Maria Chetcuti
Cauchi, Malta’s Bolar Exemption: An Incentive for Investment and Innovation, THE
EXECUTIVE, no. 32 (2011), at 7–8 (describing how different states within the EU
have more narrowly and more broadly interpreted the Bolar exemption since the
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The Maltese Bolar exception was adopted with a liberal brush,
creating a wide exception that includes acts “consist[ing] of
making or using such product for purely experimental purposes or
for scientific research” and acts “done for purposes which can
reasonably be related to the development and presentation of
information required by the law of Malta or any other country that
regulates the production, use, or sale of medicinal or
phytopharmaceutical products.”263 This exception broadly allows
experiments and scientific research.
Further, Malta enacted
additional, pro-access IP rules within an enhanced institutional
setting targeted at the development of a local pharmaceutical
industry.264
Malta provides an unusual case study for legal innovation
within the TRIPS context. Notwithstanding its generally strong IP
rules, it was the combination of Malta’s investment in a solid
business environment, implementation of key pro-innovation
patent rules, and leverage of its geographical location to attract and
build from technologies not protected domestically that
transformed the country’s economic profile. Since territoriality
remains a cornerstone of IP protection, 265 the failure of large
pharmaceutical firms to file patents in Malta presented an
opportunity for the country to court generic firms. As a result,
Malta gained a reputation of being “the ideal location for
pharmaceutical companies.” 266
Its pharmaceutical exports
EU set a lower bar with the adoption of a new European pharmaceutical
regulatory directive in 2004).
263 Patents & Designs Act, § 27(6)(b), ch. 417 (2002) (Malta).
264 Malta extended permitted use to private and noncommercial use, as well
as for any development and presentation of information.
The Maltese
government made a strategic decision to work with local educational institutions
to offer special courses to train workers in pharmaceutical manufacturing,
pharmacology, and related courses. The goal was to create a skilled workforce,
which would in turn support a pharmaceutical industry.
Moreover, Malta
enacted business-friendly laws including low taxes, worker training programs,
and loan guarantees to induce generic pharmaceutical investment. Generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers are the main players in this industry. See generally
Malta: A Healthy Location for the Pharmaceutical Industry, PHARMABOARDROOM (Jan.
1, 2011), http://www.pharmaboardroom.com/article/country-report-malta-ahealthy-location-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry.
265 See Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate
Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 153, 189 (1995) (“This is so because there
is neither a central granting authority for intellectual property operating on a
global scale, nor a central administration or a court system having worldwide
jurisdiction over matters of validity or enforcement.”).
266 KPMG, MALTA, supra note 259, at 1.
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increased from just €26 million in 2005267 to €206 million in 2011.268
The pharmaceutical industry in Malta today employs 1,000 people,
out of a total private work force of only 110,000, and exports over
€200 million in products.269
The Malta narrative is insufficiently robust to draw any grand
conclusions for developing countries in their forays in legal
innovation. Nevertheless, Malta’s explicit framing of IP as
industrial policy, if adopted by other countries, offers new
justifications (and challenges) when evaluating the WTOconsistency of particular interpretations or applications of TRIPS
obligations.
3.2.

Assessing the Pathways of Legal Innovation

India, Brazil and Malta are different countries and their
interests in the multilateral IP regime differ in strategic intent and
focus. What unites the developments described above is an
orientation of IP to focus on, and align with, domestic priorities. In
each of these cases, the tools of innovation are embedded within
the larger national legal framework. Thus, their credibility is less
assailable by critics. That these tools are part of national systems
also suggests they can be sustainably used in the foreseeable
future. In each example, the tools reflect a distinctive national
strategy in which access to knowledge and national welfare are
tightly linked across a number of related technical subjects (trade,
environment, industrial policy and IP). As a result, efforts to undo
the accomplishments yielded by these tools, or to undermine them,
are less likely to succeed in the short term given the spread of
political risk across agencies. Moreover, the tools are durable and
agile because they are anchored largely in processes and not
legislative text.
In sum, in India, the tools of innovation include a coordinated
arc of legislation, patent office action and judicial intervention. In
Brazil, it has been a highly sophisticated mix of administrative
competencies and a policy commitment to access to technology.
And in Malta, it was a decision to use TRIPS as a basis for
267 EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN
FIGURES: KEY DATA 2007 UPDATE 14 (2007).
268 EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN
FIGURES: KEY DATA 2013, 18 (2013).
269 KPMG, MALTA, supra note 259, at 1.
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constructing an entire industry in which business interests and
welfare outcomes have been, even if just temporarily, perfectly
aligned.
These public manifestations of how countries explicitly seek
the welfare benefits associated with access to technology, access to
medicines or access to knowledge suggest that, at least for the
three case studies, the forms of legal innovation employed are
likely to continue and will not just be episodic engagements with
the multilateral knowledge governance system. Further, the
methods of innovation employed in the case studies above are by
no means the only tools available—there are other forms of
innovation that have been, and will continue to be, devised in
developing and developed countries alike. For example, new
patent examination guidelines were recently adopted in Argentina
for pharmaceutical patents that, among other things, instruct
patent examiners to reject new use, new form and new formulation
patents, somewhat along the lines of India’s infamous patent
law.270 Other examples include “flexibilities-plus” rules adopted in
some European countries, such as those limiting the scope of gene
patents to the actual function of the genes (Germany), or so called
“bidders exceptions” or “breeders exceptions” regarding plant
variety protection laws.271
The heightened local awareness of IP rights (in no small part
fueled by the global access to knowledge movements), and the
effect of IP rights on the fundamental conditions of human
flourishing, suggest that developing and least-developed countries
will have new levels of domestic public accountability to the IP
regimes they negotiate globally. Twenty-one years after the TRIPS
Agreement, there are signs that the design of global IP policy, and
the pressure to accept responsibility for its effects, will not be
defined by the exclusive, private interests of firms in
technologically elite markets. A clear result of these expressions of
legal innovation, notwithstanding reprisals by developed
countries, is that a variety of new actors will have the space to
participate in shaping the intersection between multilateral IP
obligations and the domestic welfare imperatives that animate that
generation and their communities.
270
See Adoption of Guidelines for Patentability Examination of Patent
Applications for Chemical and Pharmaceutical Inventions, Joint Resolutions
118/2012, 546/2012, 107/2012 (2012) (Braz.).
271
See Carlos M. Correa, Patent Protection for Plants: Legal Options for
Developing Countries 29–30 (South Centre Research Paper No. 55, 2014) (on file
with author).
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Legal Innovation as Hegemony – Resistance in the Developed
Countries

Even in developed countries, there is a lack of uniformity, and
at times, a lack of compliance with the enforcement procedures
that these very countries pushed for. The WTO has found two U.S.
violations of TRIPS: (1) the WTO Appellate Body Havana Club Rum
decision,272 and (2) the WTO Copyright Panel decision regarding §
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,273 both of which have remained
uncorrected for over a decade. 274 The U.S. is an outlier in this
context compared to other countries such as Canada, India, China
and the EU, all of which have addressed their TRIPS violations
within an average of 10 months.275
As one of the most ardent supporters of robust enforcement
procedures, the U.S. sets a poor (or perhaps from a legal
innovation perspective, a “good”) example, especially when
compared with developing countries that are required to use much
scarcer resources to implement costly fixes. In one regard, longer
compliance times may positively signal the importance of filtering
the decisions of international bodies through democratic processes
that can better secure nationally meaningful compliance with
TRIPS obligations. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that dynamic,
innovative economies at times find the TRIPS shoes too tight for
comfort.276 Legal innovation has become more necessary in the
developed countries as they struggle under the weight of a
globalized market in which old political alliances are no longer
sufficient to overcome the economic power and asserted political
interests of the emerging countries.
The vulnerability of Western markets to new systems,
production networks and legal initiatives originating from
developing countries across various public law regimes will
272 Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002); see also supra notes 96–102 and
accompanying text (discussing the Havana Club Rum decision).
273 United States—Section 110(5), supra note 58.
274 Lee, supra note 124, at 412.
275 Id.
276
Reichman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 78, at 1119 (predicting
correctly that “efforts to rig a regime for short-term advantages may turn out, in
the medium-and long-term, to boomerang against those who pressed hardest for
its adoption).
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require that developed countries do more than simply dig their
heels in IP maximalism. Legal innovation does not emerge
overnight; reform processes, advocacy movements and political
engagement often take years to produce the type of tools witnessed
in India and Brazil. Furthermore, the calcified versions of legal
innovation deployed by developed countries through threats of
trade sanctions or aggressive diplomacy belies the strategic
importance and superiority of legal innovation that occurs more
indirectly in the developing countries through processes of
engaging domestic stakeholders.

4. LEGAL INNOVATION IN THE MAKING: THE POSSIBLE INFLUENCE
AND ROLE OF UNFORMED LAWS
Part 4 presents how, in the wake of the TRIPS Agreement,
multilateral initiatives such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) signal
a new era of uncertainty in multilateral IP norm-setting. There is
value in briefly reviewing ongoing reform initiatives – ”legal
innovation in the making” – to better appreciate the dynamic
forces that interact and react to engender particular forms of
innovation. Part 4 thus explores prospects of legal innovation
within the Brazilian and South African IP reform efforts. I posit
that the political and social maneuvering associated with IP reform
enables legal innovation to thrive by making national IP policy a
subject of public discourse and engaging multiple stakeholders
with relevant IP agencies. Ultimately, the uncertainty and fear
generated in the wake of modern plurilateral IP agreements likely
force countries to embrace legal innovation more quickly, and may
herald the re-institution of more defensible norms in the fabric of
multilateral IP treaties.
4.1.

Plurilateralism as Legal Innovation in the New Political
Economy of IP Relations

The rapid rise of networked information technologies radically
altered many of the assumptions embedded in the copyright
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. In its “bargain to the
baseline” mode, the Agreement focused on the existing
technological frontier and addressed copyright standards for a
world that had been fundamentally restructured by the conclusion
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of the Uruguay Round. Tim Berners-Lee launched mosaic in 1993,
just as the ink was drying on the TRIPS Agreement.277 With the
high pace of technological advances in the 1990s, the TRIPS
negotiations simply did not foresee many of the questions that
would frame the contours of IP protection in the digital
economy. 278 The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 279 and WIPO
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 280 thus were
negotiated at WIPO to secure authorial interests in the face of new
and evolving technological platforms; 281 the technologies most
critical to political, cultural and economic opportunities today were
not even within the orbit of the TRIPS negotiations. As discussed
below, terms of access and use of digital cultural goods have,
nevertheless, been glossed with a similar focus on preserving
private authorial control over the production and utility of
knowledge goods. Differently from TRIPS, however, these terms
emerged from a newly constructed political alliance of select
developed countries.
4.1.1.

The Digital Gap in TRIPS and Sites of Resistance:
SOPA and PIPA

The WCT entered into force two years after the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round. 282 Still, the robust new layers of rights

277
STEPHANIE SAMMARTINO MCPHERSON, TIM BERNERS-LEE: INVENTOR OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB 66 (2009).
278
Alex Shepard, ACTA on Life Support: Why the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement Is Failing and How Future Intellectual Property Treaties Might Avoid a
Similar Fate, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 673, 676 (2013) (“Being a product of
the mid-90s, TRIPS was not concerned with many of the technological innovations
that would form the basis for modern digital copyright infringement.”); see also
Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 265, 276 (2007) (remarking that when the TRIPS Agreement was
created, it did not anticipate the future challenges “posed by digital technology to
the protection and enforcement of copyright.”).
279 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec.
20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT].
280 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
281
Sun, supra note 278, at 276 (“[T]he WCT and WPPT mainly set out
provisions protecting the new right of making available, and the use of
technological measures and rights management information by right holders.”).
282 WCT, supra note 279.
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provided by the WCT 283 could not satisfy the level of control
demanded by copyright owners and could not keep pace with the
social and cultural expectations of consumers occasioned by new
technologies.
Copyright reform efforts are now underway in a number of
countries as nations attempt to tackle the challenges of the
networked information economy. The “digital gap” in the
international IP system leaves policy space for a variety of forms of
domestic legal innovation responsive to new digital platforms. In
the copyright arena, however, such innovation is not necessitated
by the constraints imposed by TRIPS, but rather by a need to
preserve policy flexibilities in a continuum of unknowns. This
flexibility is necessary to respond to an ever-changing copyright
landscape that affects economic, cultural and liberty interests far
more pervasively than IP rights were presumed to do.
Yet, as some countries experiment with expanding fair use and
fair dealing exceptions, 284 Creative Commons licensing 285 and
expanding access to orphan works286 to establish a “zone of access
and use” that might accommodate the unwieldy intersection of
personal liberty and copyright rights, other countries have tried to
push back with restrictive, secretive international agreements that
contain even more robust protection and enforcement provisions
that incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement. Many commentators
have documented the notorious beginning—and end—of some of
these efforts, but a brief summary will highlight a few instructive
points and link them to legal innovation efforts.
In the United States, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was
proposed as a bill “to promote prosperity, creativity,
entrepreneurship, and innovation by combating the theft of U.S.

283 See id. art. 11 (requiring protection against circumvention of technological
protection measures); id. art. 12 (stating rights management information
obligations).
284
See, e.g., IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 4–5 (2011) (outlining an expansion of fair
dealing exceptions in U.K. copyright).
285
See, e.g., Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil’s Copyright Reform: Schizophrenia?,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.ipwatch.org/2011/02/08/inside-views-brazils-copyright-reform-schizophrenia
(reporting the withdrawal of Brazil’s practice of Creative Commons licensing
through the Ministry of Culture).
286 Copyright (Amendment) Act, No. 27, Acts of Parliament, 2012 (India),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/ laws/en/in/in066en.pdf
(providing for compulsory licensing of orphan works).
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property, and for other purposes.” 287 It then points out in its
savings clauses that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to
impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected under
the 1st Amendment to the Constitution.”288 SOPA’s counterpart in
the Senate, The PROTECT-IP Act (PIPA), 289 was introduced to
“prevent online threats to economic creativity and theft of
intellectual property.”290 Though the Act did not have a specific
First Amendment disclaimer as SOPA did, PIPA had strikingly
similar provisions that, if passed, many feared would have had
grave implications for First Amendment free speech rights and
access to knowledge more broadly.
For example, SOPA and PIPA would have allowed the U.S.
Justice Department to obtain court orders in rem against owners of
foreign websites suspected of enabling or facilitating copyright
violations. 291 Such orders against foreign websites would have
blocked the websites without any opportunity to respond or
appeal, resulting in censorship and a direct infringement on the
freedom of speech. 292 The legislation would have not only
permitted the Justice Department to shut down websites, but also
to do so without due process given the in rem proceedings. 293
Proponents of the SOPA/PIPA legislation argued that existing
provisions in the Copyright Act were insufficient to prevent
infringing activity from foreign websites, and that websites
facilitating downloading of pirated works hurt copyright owners
as well as the economy in general.294
Opposition and outright resistance to SOPA/PIPA were swift
and unequivocal. Opponents organized an Internet “blackout” in
which Wikipedia, Google and over 115,000 other websites replaced
their homepages with an all-black page protesting SOPA and

Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong., at 1 (1st Sess. 2011).
Id. at 2.
289 PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
290 Id.
291 See generally, John Kennedy, Mary Rasenberger & M. Lorrane Ford, SOPA
and PIPA—Attempts to Stop Online Piracy by Foreign Internet Sites, 1 INTERNET L. &
PRAC. § 12:51 (2012).
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See Timothy J. Toohey, Piracy, Privacy, and Internet Openness: The Changing
Face of Cyberspace Law, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 97
(2012) (explaining how Congress enacted SOPA and PIPA in response to media
companies claiming that their legal protections for intellectual property needed to
be substantially strengthened).
287
288
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PIPA.295 Many view this protest as an excellent example of a more
democratic, user-empowered nature of the global digital
environment. The moral, economic and political success of the
corporations opposed to SOPA and PIPA reflected a new kind of
partnership with the public interest that, for the first-time, rivaled
the longstanding alliance of content industries and the U.S. IP
agencies. That partnership – and the global reach of the “digital
protest” – has indefinitely re-shaped the nature of the policy space
available for IP. At a minimum, the public is more emboldened,
and the days in which IP owners can push changes to legislation
without consideration of the public’s reaction are likely long-gone.
Both SOPA and PIPA were tabled after the blackout protest, but
strains of their principal goals are likely to re-appear elsewhere.296
4.1.2.

ACTA and the Political Gap in TRIPS: Becoming My
Brother’s Keeper

Before there was SOPA/PIPA, however, there was ACTA,
negotiated from 2007 to 2010 by the United States, the EU,
Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Singapore,
Morocco, Japan and South Korea. 297 The Agreement was
negotiated in secret outside of the traditional (and more
transparent) multilateral IP fora, such as the WTO and WIPO.298 In
October 2011, eight out of these eleven countries signed the
Agreement, with the EU, Mexico and Switzerland pledging
continued support and vowing to sign “as soon as practicable.”299
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6-7.
297
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/acta (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) [hereinafter EFF,
ACTA]. For a seminal volume exploring different aspects of ACTA, see THE
PLURILATERAL ENFORCEMENT AGENDA: THE GENESIS AND AFTERMATH OF ACTA
(Pedro Roffe & Xavier Seuba eds., 2014).
298 Id.
299
See Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
Negotiating Parties, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 1, 2011), available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag
(detailing a press release explaining the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated
goods, delineating the final round negotiations in Tokyo, Japan, and outlining the
next steps for enforcing the ACTA); see also KEI’s ACTA Timeline, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org/timelines/acta (last visited Oct. 7, 2014)
(detailing major events, press releases, and commentary on the ACTA
295
296
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The pledge of continued support may simply be lip service in some
of these abstaining countries; for example, ACTA was firmly
rejected by a 92% majority in the European Parliament in 2012 and
improved public support in the future seems highly unlikely.300
Other developing countries, such as India and Brazil, are also
firmly opposed to ACTA and have criticized such efforts to bypass
existing international IP fora.301
In the copyright context, ACTA served as a model of the most
troubling features of a new breed of multilateral IP negotiations:
(1) nondemocratic process:
in addition to the secretive and
exclusionary negotiation process, the actual enforcement,
interpretation and amendments of ACTA would be controlled
unilaterally by a non-democratic “ACTA Committee” consisting of
unelected members from signatory countries only; (2) freedom of
speech and censorship: several ACTA provisions would increase
ISPs’ liability for users’ infringing activities beyond existing law,
which may encourage excessive filtering, blocking and interference
with freedom of expression; (3) privacy and due process: the
agreement would increase the ease and speed of information
exchanges between enforcement authorities, copyright holders and
ISPs, which threatens the privacy of user information; (4) users’
rights:
ACTA would require legal protection against
circumvention of technological protection measures, even if the
reason for disabling the lock is fair, non-infringing use; and (5)
excessive civil and criminal penalties: ACTA would implement a
regime of overzealous statutory damages with no proportionality
to the crime and no exceptions for innocent infringement; criminal
negotiations).
300
See, e.g., Don Melvin, EU Parliament Rejects ACTA Anti-Piracy Treaty,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(July
4,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-07-04/eu-parliament-holds-key-voteon-anti-piracy-treaty (explaining how other major countries such as China, India
and Brazil were either not invited or have refused to join ACTA negotiations; also
explaining how ACTA would end up restricting the ability of Congress to provide
intellectual property reform); Olivia Solon, What Is ACTA and Why Should You Be
MAG.
(Jan.
24,
2012)
(U.K.),
Worried
About
It?,
WIRED
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-01/24/acta-101 (explaining how
online activists have begun mounting online opposition to ACTA, with future
opposition planned; ACTA opposed by online activists, internet companies, and
members of the European Parliament); see also EFF, ACTA, supra note 297
(explaining how the European Parliament overwhelmingly opposed ACTA and
how the American public can oppose it as well).
301 EFF, ACTA, supra note 297 (explaining how India and Brazil have rejected
ACTA from its onset and criticized its efforts to bypass existing international
fora).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/3

OKEDIJI FINALIZATION_36.1(1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/18/2015 5:36 PM

LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL IP

257

penalties would also apply for “significant willful” infringement
even if there were no “direct or indirect motivation of financial
gain,” without any of the traditional copyright limitations, such as
fair use.302
At least six of the member nations had to ratify the ACTA in
order to give it effect. Currently, only Japan has ratified the
treaty,303 although there were indications as of 2013 that Canada
was moving towards ratification.304 Many have argued that the
crushing rejection of the ACTA by the EU makes international
implementation unlikely,305 although the United States has vowed
to continue fighting for more ratifications.306
4.1.3.

Reinventing SOPA/PIPA? The “New” TPP

Like the ACTA, the TPP is being negotiated in highly secretive
regional negotiations,307 but WikiLeaks released proposed drafts of
302 Id.; see also Art Brodsky, Public Knowledge Statement on Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade
Agreement,
PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE
(Oct.
6,
2010),
http://publicknowledge.org/issues/acta (pointing out the flaws in the way the
ACTA agreement was reached).
303
Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by Japan,
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN
AFF.
OF
JAPAN
(Oct.
5,
2012),
http://mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta_conclusion_1210.html; see
also EFF, ACTA, supra note 297 (listing the states that negotiated, signed, and
subsequently ratified the ACTA).
304
Maira Sutton, Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), US Trade Office
Calls ACTA Back from the Dead and Canada Complies, EFF.ORG (Mar. 1, 2013)
[hereinafter EFF, US Trade Office], https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/ustrade-office-calls-acta-back-dead-and-canada-complies (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
305 See, e.g., David Meyer, ACTA Rejected by Europe, Leaving Copyright Treaty
Near Dead, ZDNET (July 4, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/acta-rejectedby-europe-leaving-copyright-treaty-near-dead-7000000255 (arguing that since the
European Union “flatly reject[ed]” the ACTA, and six of the eight non-EU signing
countries must ratify the ACTA for it to come into force, survival of the treaty
depends on U.S. ratification).
306
See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2013 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2012
ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/reports-and-publications/2013/2013-tpa-2012-ar
(reporting
that
discussions on ACTA were priority agenda items sponsored by the United States
in TRIPS Council meetings in 2012); see also EFF, US Trade Office, supra note 304, at
1 (observing that the United States is working with Japan “to ensure that ACTA
can come into force as soon as possible” and that Canada introduced a bill on
intellectual property ensuring compliance with the ACTA, responding to U.S.
pressure).
307
Current parties to negotiations include the United States, Australia,
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the TPP Intellectual Property Rights Chapter.308
The first leaked draft of the TPP indicated that negotiators,
particularly the U.S. negotiators, were pushing for the adoption of
IP minimum standards far more restrictive than those currently
required by TRIPS and more extreme standards than those in the
controversial ACTA.309 The second proposed draft text of the TTP
was leaked in October 2014. This draft similarly reflects robust
proposals to heighten liability and enhance copyright protection
beyond any existing multilateral copyright instrument. Digital
rights management, ISP liability and copyright term lengths
remain disputed issues among negotiating parties.310 Similar to the
TRIPS Agreement, the draft reveals differences of approach to the
breadth and nature of copyright enforcement.311
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Chile, Peru, and
New Zealand.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, EFF.ORG,
https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (naming nations
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement); see also Lydia DePillis,
Everything You Need to Know About the Trans Pacific Partnership, WASH. POST
WONKBLOG
(Dec.
11,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/11/everythin
g-you-need-to-know-about-the-trans-pacific-partnership
(discussing
the
membership of the Trans Pacific Partnership, China’s absence, and how this
regional trade agreement is a response to the WTO being too cumbersome for
“’high-standard’” trade deals).
308
See Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—IP Chapter,
WIKILEAKS.ORG (Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter WIKILEAKS], http://wikileaks.org/tpp
(displaying the leaked draft’s contents).
309 See generally Sean Flynn, Margot E. Kaminski, Brook K. Baker & Jimmy H.
Koo, Public Interest Analysis of the US TPP Proposal for an IP Chapter (Am. Univ.
Wash. College of Law PIJIP Research Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2011), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&con
text=research (providing a preliminary analysis of the initial leaked drafts of the
TTP). See also Carolina Rossini & Yana Welinder, All Nations Lose with TPP’s
Expansion of Copyright Terms, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/all-nations-lose-tpps-expansioncopyright-terms (arguing that all nations will be harmed by having to adopt
extended copyright terms that give excessive protection to large U.S. record and
movie production companies that lobbied for such changes in the U.S.).
310 See Updated Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) — IP Chapter
(second publication), WIKILEAKS.ORG (Oct. 16, 2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/
[hereinafter WIKILEAKS 2].
311 Jeremy Malcom & Maira Sutton, Latest TPP Leak Shows US Still Pushing
Terrible DRM and Copyright Term Proposals—and New Threats Arise, EFF.ORG (Oct.
16, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/latest-tpp-leak-shows-usstill-pushing-terrible-drm-and-copyright-term-proposals.
In particular, the
United States is pushing for a broader enforcement of criminal liability, which
would extend to acts of non-commercial infringement. Id. Canada disagrees,
arguing that criminal remedies should only apply to commercial conduct. In
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Commentators vigorously criticize the TPP’s IP Chapter for its
inconsistency with existing laws in every TPP member country,
including the U.S. itself. In particular, the obvious retreat from
policy flexibilities available in TRIPS that allow countries to
experiment with social welfare policies, including addressing the
supply of public goods, has been very controversial.312 The future
of the TPP is still unclear and the shape of its IP Chapter is even
more so. But ongoing national copyright reform efforts in many
key countries suggest that there is plenty of room to anticipate
conflicts over the extent to which multi-stakeholder national
reforms can be dialed back to accommodate multilateral rules that
might emerge. To the extent the two tracks produce conflict, it will
only create more room to engage in the kind of legal innovation we
have witnessed in the twenty-one years of the TRIPS Agreement.
At its most fundamental, legal innovation is a testament to the
irreducibility of the “local” and the “domestic” despite a world
permeated with multilateral disciplines. The IP reform efforts in
Brazil and South Africa, briefly discussed below, are good
examples of the resilience of the domestic welfare impulse where
IP policy is concerned. These reform efforts are, in themselves,
forms of legal innovation directed at defining the relationship
between TRIPS and any future multilateral engagement in IP
norm-setting processes.
4.2.

Brazil’s IP Reform

Brazil recently launched a patent reform process and issued a
patent reform report in 2013. 313 The report outlines paths to
stimulate innovation in Brazil and to strengthen national
industries. 314 Although the report is generally an outline
addition, the draft contains a new rule against formalities. Id. This language
appears to be agreed upon by the negotiating parties and could present
difficulties should any of the negotiating parties seek to re-introduce formalities
into copyright protections that reach beyond minimum international standards.
See Krista Cox, New WikiLeaks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Intellectual
Property Chapter—Analysis of Copyright Provisions, ARL POL’Y NOTES (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://policynotes.arl.org/post
/100163582662/new-wikileaks-of-the-transpacific-partnership.
312 Flynn et. al, supra note 309, at 2–4.
313 CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, supra note 256.
314 Id. at 10 (discussing the use of seminars and debates involving a wide
range of representatives to produce innovative new ideas to develop the scope of
Brazilian patent legislation).
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recommending patent policy moving forward, it has produced
some results.
The first is a patent reform bill.315 This bill limits patent terms
to a strict maximum of twenty years, in contrast to the current
Patent Act, which authorizes some extensions beyond twenty
years.316 It clarifies that new-use patents and new forms of known
substances are not considered inventions.317 It also heightens the
inventive step standard, creates a pre-grant opposition system,
updates ANIVSA’s Prior Consent mechanism, clarifies the
protection of undisclosed pharmaceutical test data and implements
the public non-commercial use mechanism as set forth by TRIPS.318
Additionally, the report resulted in a Presidential Decree creating
the Council of Intellectual Property Rights. 319 The report
emphasizes the importance of economic, social and technological
advancement in developing countries.320
To improve on the patent system, the report makes a series of
recommendations. It recommends heightened non-obviousness
standards so that frivolous patents are not granted and incremental
innovations are widely developed. 321 Additionally, it advocates
that new-use and polymorph patents should not be granted, as
they do not meet the patentability requirements of novelty and
non-obviousness.322 The report also calls for an avenue for pregrant opposition, allowing for an increase in the quality of
patents. 323 Although the current Brazilian patent law already
allows for compulsory licenses, the report calls for a more
elaborate public non-commercial-use mechanism. 324 Finally, a
warning is offered against examining software patent applications
without an “extensive public consultation . . . regarding the risks

H.R. 5402/2013 (May 2013).
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, supra note 256, at 13–14.
317 Id. at 14.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 39. The original Patent Act, passed in 1997, intended to reach these
same goals. But, the report argues that none of this took place after the original
Patent Act was passed. Furthermore, the strengthened IP rights following the
original Patent Act had a negative impact on access to health products and
processes.
321 Id. at 65.
322 Id. at 127.
323 Id. at 70–78.
324 Id. at 90–99.
315
316
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and eventual benefits that the practice can offer to Brazil[.]”325
The Brazilian process is highly unstable, politically
controversial, and its future is uncertain. Nonetheless, it has
produced important signals about Brazil’s orientation toward the
role of patent law in its economic development. As an unfolding
process, nothing in the draft bill can technically be a basis for a
TRIPS complaint. However, the principles, concerns and proposals
in the draft bill have an important normative influence on Brazil’s
existing patent law and institutions. Not only do the draft
provisions reflect an intention to maximize TRIPS flexibilities, they
also point forward to the development of doctrine in areas that
TRIPS did not fully occupy. In short, the reform process has been
an experiment station in which new ideas, while not fully formed,
nonetheless suggest an expanding capacity and agility to leverage
patent law in the design of Brazil’s future economy.
Brazil is also engaged in an intensely watched and contested
copyright reform process. In late November 2011, the third version
of Brazil’s copyright reform draft bill was leaked.326 The leaked bill
contains many new and modified provisions, including the
addition of works for hire with employer control limited to ten
years, the exhaustion of copyrights after the first authorized sale in
a WTO member country, the authors’ ability to put their works
into the public domain during their lifetime and expanded
compulsory licenses.327 Exceptions to copyright infringement are
expanded 328 to include space-shifting, reproductions for persons
with more than just visual disabilities, reproductions of lectures,
addresses, and lessons by the intended audience, reproductions for
conservation and preservation purposes, and musical
performances in religious temples—while, at the same time,
further restricting public performance exceptions. 329
Id. at 205.
See Pedro Paranaguá, Inside Views: Brazil’s Leaked Copyright Reform Draft
Bill Shows Latest Thinking, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 12, 2011, 7:26 PM)
[hereinafter
Paranaguá,
Leaked
Draft],
http://www.ipwatch.org/2011/12/12/brazils-leaked-copyright-reform-draft-bill-shows-latestthinking (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (describing the leaked content of the Brazilian
copyright reform).
327 Id.
328
See Pedro Mizukami, Brazilian Copyright Reform Draft Bills Comparative
Tables,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG,
http://infojustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/Brazilian-Copyright-Reform-Comparative-Table.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (displaying a table of the proposed changes to copyright
law in the leaked Brazilian reform).
329 Another controversial bill at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is the
325
326
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Like the patent reform process, the final landing strip for the
Brazilian copyright reform is not yet clear. Nonetheless, some of
the bold initiatives and massive efforts to engage the Brazilian
polity already reveal a deep understanding of the cultural impact
of copyright policy in society. The reform process has already
committed itself to rhetoric about access to knowledge that, even if
not borne out in formal law, will undoubtedly shape the
conceptual framework of the knowledge economy and the
expectations of the Brazilian society for some time to come.
4.3.

South Africa’s Draft IP Policy

In 2013, the Republic of South Africa’s Department of Trade
and Industry issued a Draft Policy for its framework on intellectual
property. 330 Because South Africa does not have a national IP
policy, the DTI sought to ensure coherence through the new policy
framework.331 The document provides a basic outline of the policy
objectives and provides background on issues that IP policy should
address, such as public health, agriculture, genetic resources,
indigenous knowledge, the Internet, software issues and various
Marco Civil bill. See Pedro Mizukami, Copyright Week: What Happened to the
Brazilian
Copyright
Reform,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG
(Jan.
20,
2014),
http://infojustice.org/archives/31993 (last visited Oct 8, 2014) (discussing the
recent history of copyright law reform in Brazil and controversy over the Marco
Civil bill for “eschewing a notice-and-takedown system”). The initial version of
the bill, which was the result of a public-consultation process, promoted free
speech and open access by requiring a court order for all content removals. Id.
Under this proposed system, “content would be removed from the Internet only
in response to a court order, eschewing a notice-and-takedown system,” which
can be found in other countries such as the U.S. Id. This court-order system
empowered creators and sharers of online information and improved the power
imbalance between users, service providers, and the entertainment industry. Id.
Unfortunately, concessions were made to industry lobbyists, and the current
version of Marco Civil creates an exception: the Marco Civil court-order system is
not applicable to copyright infringement. Id. This means that content removal
involving copyright infringement will be subject to Brazil’s copyright reform bill,
rather than Marco Civil. As of its third draft, the copyright reform bill has a
notice and takedown structure similar to that adopted by the U.S. See Paranaguá,
Leaked Draft, supra note 329 (discussing the leaked draft’s new ISP liability,
including the new notice-and-takedown structure).
330
DEP’T. OF TRADE & INDUS., DRAFT NATIONAL POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (IP) OF SOUTH AFRICA: A POLICY FRAMEWORK (2013), available at
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SA-IP-PolicySept-2013-36816_gen918.pdf.
331 Id. at 5.
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copyright and patent reforms.332
The framework importantly addresses “Patent[s] and Access to
Public Health.” 333 This section emphasizes that because South
Africa is using a depository system, which grants weak patents, it
limits access to public health.334 South Africa, like India, pushes for
pre- and post-opposition of patents to “foster the spirit of granting
stronger patents.” 335 Referencing the flexibilities allowed to
developing countries by the Doha Declaration, the framework
recommends amending the Patents Act to be “amenable to issues
related to access to public health.”336 To further promote public
health, it recommends introducing compulsory licensing that
adheres to international treaties.337
In the section on agricultural and genetic resources, the
framework recommends that developing countries should not
provide patent protection for plants and animals, with an
exception for certain types of biotechnology-related patents.338 In
particular, the framework recommends an amendment to South
Africa’s PVP (plant-variety-protection) system to allow farmers to
“reuse, resell and exchange seeds.”339
Regarding the advancement of developing countries, the
framework encourages the expanded use of the flexibilities
afforded by the TRIPS Agreement and firmly rejects any trade
agreements that are TRIPS-plus in nature. 340 The framework is
particularly blunt in cautioning against advice or agreements
involving developed nations: “South Africa . . . must cautiously
filter advice coming from these developed nations and their
institutions as they may undermine the multilateral arrangements
or may not be sensitive to IP and development.”341
Pharmaceutical companies in particular have reacted
negatively to the new proposals. The Innovative Pharmaceutical
Association of South Africa hired a lobbying firm to oppose the
draft policy and to persuade the South African government to

332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341

Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
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strengthen patent protection, rather than weaken it. 342 On the
other hand, health activist groups, including the Treatment Action
Campaign and Médecins Sans Frontières, strongly support South
Africa’s draft IP framework and have condemned the
pharmaceutical lobbying attempt.343
Similar to the Brazilian reform process, South Africa’s Draft
Policy creatively establishes the contours of the domestic IP debate
in a way that delimits the role of the multilateral system without
violating the TRIPS Agreement. The Draft Policy is neither
explicitly legal nor political. Instead, it employs a cultural
framework in which the sole organizing thrust is the question of
how IP law can advance South African interests in the areas that
are relevant to the country’s stylized vision of the future, while at
the same time identifying ways that will not lead to that land of
promise.
Indeed, it is interesting to note how concerns about TRIPS
obligations or violations are not a major theme of the report, nor is
the theme anti-TRIPS as such. Rather, in a manner presaging legal
innovation, the Draft Policy proceeds in terms that may best be
described as “in spite of TRIPS.” The future of the Draft Policy or
any prospects of hard law emerging from its pages are highly
uncertain. However, that may not be the purpose of the Draft
Policy. Instead, the Policy is best understood as a first step in
concretizing and formalizing a vision of welfare that the country
can own. This distinctive mark of ownership over IP policy is, by
itself, a material step in the advancement of the benefits classically
linked to a socially accountable knowledge economy.
4.4.

TRIPS, Legal Innovation and the Age of Uncertainty

The parallel efforts of plurilateralism, with its stronger and less
flexible IP provisions, and national reform efforts, with bold
experimentation of maximalist interpretations of TRIPS
flexibilities, clearly illustrate that the national context has once
342 See Linda Daniels, Concerns Erupt over Leaked Pharma Lobbying Plan Against
IP Policy in South Africa, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:14 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/01/22/concerns-erupt-over-leaked-pharmalobbying-plan-against-ip-policy-in-south-africa (explaining how the South African
Trade and Industry Minister named a pharmaceutical company’s lobbying
attempt against the implementation of a new intellectual property policy for the
country “a plan for genocide”).
343 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/3

OKEDIJI FINALIZATION_36.1(1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/18/2015 5:36 PM

LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL IP

265

again become the reference point for international IP relations.
Despite ongoing plurilateral talks, countries will continue to
delineate their own appropriate national borders in the shadows of
the TRIPS Agreement. National reform movements will likely
continue to grow and spread to other countries. 344 While
plurilateral efforts reflect a top-down approach to harmonization,
national IP policies and reform initiatives often reflect just the
opposite. History is clear that the latter approach, in which
national laws evolve and eventually converge, is the more
sustainable of the two. This is perhaps even more important in
light of the necessary link IP law must have to economic growth
and development in all countries.345
The TRIPS Agreement represents an effort to change the role of
the state in relation to markets and in relation to its obligations to
its citizens; 346 a myriad of dynamic forms of legal innovation
suggests that while the former is plausible, the latter is untenable.
This heralds an uncertain future for the TRIPS Agreement. The
implausibility of a stable future for TRIPS as originally imagined is
further accentuated by the complex web of actors who interact to
influence, negotiate and control international IP standards.
As noted in Part 1, the TRIPS Agreement attempted to create a
system of equality and non-discrimination among member states
through two principles: NT and MFN. Although these provisions
may establish formal equality, in reality, the TRIPS Agreement falls
short of creating a system of substantive equality between
344
For example, India recently announced that it will be developing a
comprehensive national IP policy over the next six months. See Govt Signals IPR
Recast Ahead of Modi’s US Visit, INDIAN EXPRESS BUS. (Sept. 9, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/govt-signals-ipr-recastahead-of-modis-us-visit; see also Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s IP Policy on Stage as
Modi Heads to US,
IP-WATCH
(May
9,
2014),
http://www.ipwatch.org/2014/09/05/indias-ip-policy-on-stage-as-new-leader-heads-to-us
(discussing the possibility of significant changes to India’s IP rights regime). The
first draft of India’s IP policy was opened for public comment in January 2015. See
Peter Leung, India Releases First Draft of National IP Rights Policy, MANAGING
INTELL.
PROP.
(Jan.
6,
2015),
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3414568/India-releases-first-draft-ofNational-IP-Rights-Policy.html.
345 For an in-depth discussion of the tenuous relationship between strong
IPRs, FDI, and economic growth in developing countries, see generally KEITH E.
MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 78 (2000)
(examining the multifaceted, economic impact of expanded intellectual property
rights due to the emergence of global policy making) and Reichman, Twenty-First,
supra note 78 (analyzing the reactive role being played by developing countries in
the formation of global policy on intellectual property rights).
346 Shaffer, supra note 79.
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developed and developing countries. 347 This one-size-fits-all
model fails to account for critical distinctions between member
countries, including political and democratic limitations. Similarly,
in the developing and least-developed countries, TRIPS and the
new multilateral processes fail to distinguish between the political
and cultural costs of economic and technological barriers to
development. The trade principles of formal equality serve to
exacerbate substantive inequities between developed and
developing member states, particularly by impeding nuanced
trade, development and investment efforts that differentiate
between states by development status.348
To reach a measure of substantive equality between the
developed and developing world, effective economic and
technological development efforts require some differential
treatment among states, or as some critics argue, “positive
discrimination.”349 This will necessitate a reassessment of current
principles of formal non-discrimination and an acknowledgement
that legal innovation will respond to any effort to enforce a
harmonized national IP environment without regard to national
welfare interests. Scholars recognize that textual recognition of
positive discrimination is an uphill battle. Nonetheless, some
suggest that the development of exceptions or flexible
interpretations of non-discrimination by legislative and judicial
actors at the domestic and international levels remains possible.350
347 See, e.g., Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in
International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 114–18 (2008) (“[A]
relatively small percentage of the complaints filed with the WTO have been filed
by developing countries, and developed countries like the United States have
refused to implement WTO rulings adverse to their domestic interests. These
facts suggest that, ‘after a decade of operation the WTO remains a rich man’s club
beyond the reach of most developing nations.’”); Margaret Chon, Intellectual
Property and Theories of Developmental Justice, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS
PLUS ERA 256, 259, 279 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2014) (advocating for
“substantive equality” over “formal equality,” departing from a strict application
of the principle of non-discrimination by taking into account not only whether a
country is rich or poor, but also each country’s development status with respect to
international intellectual property law and development-sensitive human needs).
348 Barbosa et al., supra note 347, at 114–15.
349
Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development:
Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 257–58 (2007).
350 See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 347, at 117 (supporting an approach
where both domestic and international “lawmaker[s] would exercise more
skepticism towards the validity of a regulation where it conflicts with a
development-sensitive human need, as defined in part by the Millennium
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In other words, a call for additional legal innovation yet persists.
CONCLUSION
Legal innovation with regard to the TRIPS Agreement is not
occurring in isolation. Rather, it reflects part of a broader
transformation in international economic relations – one in which
the increased political and economic leverage of middle-income
developing countries has made multilateral bargains much harder
to obtain. However, the weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement could
be, ultimately, also its greatest triumph. Developed countries may
learn the lesson that bargaining towards the baseline of existing
economic and institutional realities, whether in developing country
markets or in their own domestic markets, is a short-term strategy
at best. For the developing countries, there are prospects that
opportunities at the national level to dial back policy losses
attributable to imbalanced capacity and lack of resources for
international negotiations can, and likely will, emerge. This has
clearly been the case with respect to the outcomes of the Uruguay
Round.
For both sets of countries, the twenty-first year of the TRIPS
Agreement is an opportunity to acknowledge and embrace various
forms of resistance and innovation in international intellectual
property relations. Rather than unraveling the TRIPS Agreement,
such innovation may, instead, serve to strengthen those TRIPS
norms around which all countries can respond to the compliance
and welfare costs of the forced convergence of global IP norms. At
a minimum, twenty-one years of TRIPS should have taught the
global community that national welfare considerations will
inevitably resist, and legal innovation will invariably emerge, to
counter the imprudence of a treaty that attempts to subvert the
very territorial and self-seeking national ends for which IP law
exists. It is in this complicated context of power, law and economic
Development Goals”); Broude, supra note 349, at 258 (“[A]ny formalization of
differentiation smacks of discrimination that might unsettle MFN [(Most Favored
Nation)] as a fundamental principle of the WTO's trade functionality, regardless
of its pervasive erosion through regionalization. The GATT/WTO system
therefore may be more comfortable with an informal and inevitably nontransparent system of de facto differentiation.”); Chon, supra note 347 (noting some
potential ways of informal and de facto differentiation for nations and lawmakers).
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interdependence that the TRIPS Agreement “comes of age”351 yet
again.

351 J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation
with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 441 (2000).
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